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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the great ironies of the recent drive to global free trade
- evidenced most notably in the negotiation and implementation
of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")' and
the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT")2 - is the inclusion of intellectual property on
the free trade bandwagon. By definition, protecting intellectual
property is about restricting trade in certain goods. And the
pharmaceutical industry in the United States, the beneficiary of
massive subsidies and border protection against unwanted import
competition, has played a critical role in placing intellectual
property protection on the free trade agenda.
Yet, ironic or not, intellectual property protection has become
a central part of the free trade agenda, as well as the major global
trade agreements. This Article considers how this state of affairs
* Editor, Multinational Monitor and Director of Essential Information's
International Projects (Washington, D.C.). J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School.
Special thanks to Eben Moglen, as well as to Gregory T. Parks and the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law editing
team.
1 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993), reprinted in THE NAFTA
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office ed., 1993); see also North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993)
(implementing necessary changes in U.S. law to comply with NAFTA and
reprinting the agreement).
2 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter Final Act].
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came about, and what it means for the Third World. Its crucial
concern is the range of pharmaceutical patent policy options that
remain open to Third World nations in the wake of the successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the ensuing establishment
of the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
Section 2 provides some background on the range of possible
patent regimes. The goal of this section is to emphasize that there
is more than a single approach to patent policy. There are viable
alternatives to U.S.-style laws that current strict protectors of
patents have historically used.
Section 3 recounts the U.S. pharmaceutical industry's political
offensive over the last fifteen years designed to force all nations to
adopt restrictive patent laws on the model of the United States.
Restrictive in this context means that they grant more rather than
less control to the patent holder. Restrictive patent rules are
therefore the sort preferred by pharmaceutical patent holders.
This section is itself divided into two parts. The first part
describes the maneuverings and power plays the pharmaceutical
industry has used with tremendous success to advance its global
interests. The second part focuses on the way the debate over
global patent policy has been framed - the language, metaphors
and, imagery characterizing the debate and how they have shaped
conceptions about property, particularly conceptions of moral
right. This part further shows how the pharmaceutical industry
is attempting - on the political level, and in the way it frames its
arguments - to suppress alternatives to its preferred intellectual
property regime. By elucidating this effort, this part attempts to
reinforce the very point the industry is trying to obscure: that
there are alternatives.
Section 4 undertakes a close analysis of the GATT Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement ("TRIPS" or
"the Agreement"),3 the basic thrust of which is to require all
signatory nations to adopt U.S.-style patent laws. This part argues
that despite its highly restrictive appearance, the Agreement in fact
leaves a number of options open to Third World signatory
nations. Under the Agreement, these countries must provide
3 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 66, para. 1, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994).
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some patent protection, but it can differ in significant ways from
the protections of U.S. law.
Section 5 considers the costs and benefits of various patent
policy alternatives. It focuses especially on compulsory licensing
schemes. The concluding part of this Article outlines a patent
policy approach for Third World nations that conforms to the
TRIPS Agreement and would better serve their national interests
than strict U.S.-style laws.
2. PATENT POLICY OPTIONS
2.1. Patent Policy Rationale
The logic underlying the creation of patents4 is familiar:
while society wants knowledge in the public domain, inventors
need protection for their innovations in order to maintain an
incentive for creative inquiry.5  The inventor could provide
herself some protection by withholding information regarding the
specifics of her invention. However, this would keep the informa-
tion out of the public domain. The attraction of the patent, in
addition to certain enforcement and administrability benefits, is
that the inventor immediately places her newly-created knowledge
in the public domain. In exchange, she receives exclusive rights
to use the patented knowledge for a limited period of time.6
Justified even on its own terms, the patent is not an unmitigat-
ed good. Rather, it represents a compromise between competing
interests.7 While the patent represents a positive good to the
extent that it provides desirable protection to inventors, it
represents a compromise from the perspective of public use.8 It
' In the United States, for example, patents are awarded for new, useful,
and nonobvious products or processes, or new, useful and nonobvious improve-
ments to existing products or processes. See 35 U.S.C. % 101, 103(a) (1994).
s See Gary Myers, The Restatement's Rejection of the Misappropriation Tort:
A Victory for the Public Domain, 47 S.C. L. REV. 673, 685 (1996) (proclaiming
the virtues of a system "which can provide protections sufficient to offer
suitable incentives to create, while also limiting those rights in a manner that
will permit broad access to information").
6 For example, in the United States, that period of time is 20 years. See 35
U.S.C. S 154(a)(2) (1994).
7 See Wendy J. Gordon, Comment, Assertive Modesty: An Economics of
Intangibles, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2579, 2593 n.8 (1994) (explaining the policy
balance involved).
' See id.
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does accomplish its stated goal of placing information regarding
the newly invented item in the public domain, but it does so at
the expense of conditioning the right to use this information
commercially on securing a license from the patent holder. A
license can usually only be acquired for a fee and, in the case of
pharmaceuticals, is often not available for any feasible price.
2.2. Specific Policy Options
As applied to pharmaceuticals, or any product, there is a wide
range of options in striking the balance between competing
interests, some of which can be pursued in conjunction with
others.
2.2.1. U.S.-Style Patent Protections
At one end of the spectrum is the strict U.S. patent regime.9
The U.S. system provides twenty years of patent protection for
both processes and products.1 0 There are no compulsory terms
for patent holders, who are free to license or not license their
patent, to use it or let it lie dormant for its entire life.'
2.2.2. No Patents
At the other end of the spectrum is a no-patent regime. Until
recently, Argentina and Brazil had no-patent systems for
pharmaceuticals. 2  Companies were free to copy and sell
pharmaceuticals invented by other companies, even if patented in
other countries, without penalty."' Unlike CD copying in
China, which has been the object of so much recent attention and
fury,14 pharmaceutical companies in Argentina and Brazil
engaged in copying were not violating domestic law.
9 See 35 U.S.C. S 101-203 (1994).
10 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
n See 35 U.S.C. % 101-203 (1994).
12 See Bruce Rubenstein, Latin American Slow to Protect Patents Under
Nafta, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, v. 6, No. 52, Mar. 1996, at 17 (discussing Brazil's
reluctance to implement any patent scheme); Argentina: No Patents or Dru s
Till 2005, MARKETLETTER, Nov. 7, 1994, at 11 (stating that even if Argentina s
Congress passed the contemplated patent bill, pharmaceuticals would not enjoy
patent protection until the year 2005).
13 See Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 17.
14 See Paul Blustein, U.S. Warns China to Step Up Efforts Against 'Piracy',
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1995, at B13.
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2.2.3. Process Versus Product Patents
One in-between position is to issue patents only on products
and not on processes, or only on processes and not on prod-
ucts.1' Until recently, India's patent scheme was process-only for
pharmaceuticals. 16 A drug inventor could patent the process by
which he produced a pharmaceutical, but not the drug itself.
17
Another producer was free to synthesize the same drug if she was
able to develop another industrial process to do so.18
2.2.4. Diferent Length of Terms
The period of patent protection can be shortened or length-
ened. Although the United States long held its seventeen year
period inviolate, 9 there is no inherent reason why the protection
could not be afforded for only ten years - or thirty years, for
that matter.
2.2.5. Compulsory Licensing
In a compulsory licensing scheme, U.S.-style patents are
granted, with one major caveat. During the patent's exclusive
term, patent holders are required to grant non-exclusive licenses
to competitors, or any entity that wants to use the patent, in
exchange for a reasonable licensing fee.20 Until recently, Canada
maintained a compulsory licensing system for pharmaceuticals. 21
" For a summary of the arguments respecting process patents, see generally
Lara L. Douglass, Note, Medical Process Patents: Can We Live Without Them?
Should We?, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 161 (1995).
16 See Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent
Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 507, 520 (1996).
17 See Gerald J Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The
Need for Improved Patent Protection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307, 311 (1987).
s See id.
19 Although the United State first afforded patent protection in 1793, the
term of patent protection was only 17 years until 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-
465, S 532(a)(1), 108 Stat. 4809, 4984 (1994) (amending 35 U.S.C. S 154 (1988)).
20 For examples and an overview of compulsory licensing systems
throughout the world, see Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory
Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 J.L. & TECH. 349 (1993).
21 See Janet Hamilton, What's Going on in Intellectual Property Law?, 84
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 256, 258 (1990).
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2.2.6. Work-the-Patent Requirements
These requirements have at least two variants. In one, a
patent holder who does not "work the patent" - that is, bring it
to the market, either as its own good or as a component in
another good - within a certain time frame loses his patent
rights. This policy addresses the concern that giant companies
might file for and control huge numbers of patents, thereby
locking up domains of knowledge, even though they do not put
the patented knowledge to use. This purely anti-competitive
activity undermines the public policy balancing embodied in the
initial grant of a patent. This type of work-the-patent require-
ment probably has little applicability to the pharmaceutical
industry. In contrast, the second work-the-patent variant applies
directly to the drug industry. It requires a patent holder to
literally "work the patent" in the country where it holds the
patent. For example, if Uruguay had such a requirement, and
Johnson & Johnson took out a patent on a new drug, it could not
meet this requirement merely by selling the new drug in Uruguay.
It would have to produce the new drug in Uruguay or lose patent
protection there.
2.2.7 Tax Schemes
Taxes can be levied on the sale of patented goods, with the
proceeds allocated to purposes such as domestic research. This
would allow a country to reap the benefits of economic advantage
from the patents and re-invest those benefits in furthering
scientific knowledge.
2.2.8. Price Controls
A nation can seek to limit drug prices by instituting a partial
or across-the-board system of price controls on pharmaceuticals.
Price controls on pharmaceuticals are common throughout the
industrialized worldY
2.3. Modern Patent Policies
Most industrialized countries now maintain strict patent
' See, e.g., H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., tit I(f), § 1572 (1994)
(containing President Clinton's recent proposal for drug price controls).
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regimes, but many of those nations only adopted strict patent laws
in recent years."
After World War II, many Third World nations began
experimenting with the range of patent policy variations.24 This
experimentation became more purposeful in the 1960s and early
1970s, when a call for a new international economic order arose
from the Third World.' Third World policy makers focused
attention on the issue of technology transfer.26  No-patent
regimes, compulsory programs, and process patent systems all
attracted the attention of Third World governments and were
used increasingly by these countries.'
3. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY OFFENSIVE
3.1. Political Maneuvering
By the late 1970s, the momentum underlying the call for a
new international economic order had slowed significantly. With
the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the momentum shifted
direction. By 1985, the pharmaceutical industry was on the
offensive, in an effort to force Third World countries to adopt
U.S.-style patent laws.28  While the industry attempted to
directly persuade Third World policy makers of the merits of
guaranteeing strict patent protection, its main strategy was to
persuade U.S. policy makers to coerce Third World countries to
adopt restrictive patent rules.29
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry trade association - until
recently known as the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
("PMA") and now called the Pharmaceutical Research and
2' See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
24 See GARY GEREFFI, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND DEPENDEN-
CY IN THE THIRD WORLD 3 (1983) [hereinafter GEREFFI, PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY] (stating that "modernization theory arose after World War II").
2s See id. at 128-35 (citing the example of Mexico's "new major policy
initiatives in this time period).
26 See id. at 202-03 (citing India's attempts to transfer technology from
transnational corporations to domestic industries through the use of various
altered policies).
2 See id.
2 See Julie Kosterlitz, P" Higher Prices, NAT'L J., Feb. 13, 1993, at 76.
29 See id.
10751996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Manufacturers Association ("PhRMA")30 - became one of the
most aggressive and high profile trade groups in Washington.31
The PMA hired Gerald Mossinghoff, Assistant Commerce
Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks in the
Reagan administration from 1981 to 1985, as its president.
Other prominent government officials also spun through the
revolving door between government and the pharmaceutical
industry. For example, PMA vice president Harvey E. Bale Jr.
worked at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR")
for twelve years, leaving in 1987.3' David Bier, vice president for
government affairs at Genentech Inc., a San Francisco-based
biotechnology company, formerly worked on trade and intellectu-
al property matters for the House Judiciary Committee.34
Reprresentatives of the PMA and individual pharmaceutical
companies acquired seats on important advisory boards that shape
government policy. Executives from Dow Chemical Co., Johnson
& Johnson, Merck, and other pharmaceutical firms became part
of a special presidential trade advisory group.3 Senior officials
from the PMA, Pfizer, and Immunon Technologies 3 joined a
technical advisory committee to the USTR on intellectual
property rights. Officials from DuPont, Monsanto and Procter
& Gamble, each of which has significant pharmaceutical interests,
also served on the advisory committee.38 The industry also
undertook aggressive high-profile lobbying campaigns, testifying
frequently before Congressional committees about the need to
secure greater patent protection abroad. One significant element
of the industry's political campaign was the funding of academic
30 See Victor Ostrowidski, A New Look at the PMA: Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association Changes Name to Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers Association, AM. DRUGGIST, June 1, 1994, at 11.
31 See Kosterlitz, supra note 28, at 77.
32 See id.
3 See id. ("Bale concedes that his connections are a plus for PMA. 'I hope
so,' he said. 'I don't hide it. In fact, I'm happy to help them out.'").
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 Immunon Technologies is a Bedford Hills, New York, biotechnology
firm. See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.
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studies proclaiming the merits of strict patent protections.
Although the industry would come under attack domestically
in the 1980s and 1990s for maintaining inflated prices on domestic
sales, the campaign for the U.S. government to adopt the
industry's international goals as its own met with tremendous
success.4" Framing other nations' intellectual property regimes
as a U.S. trade issue,4" the pharmaceutical industry succeeded in
making strict international protection of intellectual property a
central goal of U.S. international economic policy.
The industry's success manifested itself in at least three ways.
First, the Office of the USTR exerted extraordinary pressure on
individual Third World countries to adopt U.S.-style patent
laws.42 Second, intellectual property protection became a central
component of NAFTA, and promises to be included in any
additional regional free trade agreements involving the United
States. 43 Third, and most importantly, the United States insisted
that intellectual property protection be included in the Uruguay
Round GATT negotiations, which began in 1986 and finally
concluded in 1994.44
39 See id.
40 U .S. Trade Representative Clayton K. Yeutter recalls that when he
left government service at the end of the Ford administration, hardly
anyone in Washington had ever heard of the notion of intellectual
property. He returned to government two years ago to find it one of
the hottest buzzwords in town. 'Intellectual property issues have
become central to congressional debate on trade policy,' says Sen.
Patrick Leahy CD-Vt.).
John Burgess, Fighting Trespassing on "Intellectual Property"." U.S. Tries to Prevent
Overseas Copying of Everything From Music to Microchips, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,
1987, at H1.
41 The industry's success in framing its goal of securing strict patent
protection in other countries was itself a victory. This is especially true in light
of the disparity between the industry's objectives and the traditional domain
of international trade policy - which was primarily focused on tariff and
related matters. See Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555, 559-79 (1996) (discussing
the -history and legacy of the GATT system prior to the Uruguay Round).
42 See Burgess, supra note 40, at H1, H4 (detailing the extensive pressure
exerted by various U.S. government authorities, including the USTR).
13 See International Agreements: Intellectual Property Enforcement to Play
Major Role in NAFTA Talks, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1553 (Oct.
23, 1991).
41 See Burgess, supra note 40, at H4.
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3.1.1. Section 301
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Office of the USTR, acting on
the authority conferred on it by Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, undertook an annual rite of placing countries which did not
provide adequate protection to U.S. intellectual property on
"watch lists" and "priority watch lists."4' Those countries placed
on watch lists were notified that the United States would impose
trade sanctions upon them (in the form of tariffs on their exports
to the United States) if they did not reform their patent laws.46
The process was intensified after 1988, when Congress enacted
"Special 301" of the 1988 Trade Act, a provision which required
the USTR to impose sanctions on countries which did not revise
their patent laws.47
Although the USTR placed several dozen countries on watch
lists, the main targets of USTR sanction threats were large Third
World countries that had begun to develop domestic industries to
compete against U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers in their
domestic market: India, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, and Thai-
land.48  Some observers speculated that the USTR focused
particularly on India and Brazil because of their leading role in
advancing Third World demands in GATT negotiations.49
In October 1988, for the first time in the intellectual property
arena, the United States acted on its trade sanction threats.50
Acting in response to a petition filed by the PMA,5 and follow-
ing lengthy negotiations, the Reagan administration imposed 100%
tariffs on thirty-nine million dollars worth of Brazilian imports.2
" See Hills Removes Taiwan, Korea, Saudia Arabia from Priority List; Five
Countries Remain, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1436 (Nov. 8, 1989).
46 See id.
41 See Kantor Singles Out Brazil, India, Thailand for Special 301 Designation,
10 Int'l Trade Rep. BNA) No. 18, at 726 (May 5, 1993).
48 See id.
41 See Reagan, Charging Patent Piracy, Imposes Sanctions on $39 Million of
Brazilian Goods, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1415 (Oct. 26, 1988)
(reporting on comments from foreign relations officials in Brazil).
50 See id.
51 In addition to requiring certain action by the USTR, Section 301 and
Special 301 allow private parties to petition the Trade Representative to impose
sanctions against a country for discriminating against U.S. products. See id.
52 See id.
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The government claimed that this amount was equivalent to the
market loss to U.S. pharmaceutical makers arising from Brazil's
relative lack of patent protections for pharmaceuticals.53 The
Brazilian government and media reacted with outrage. Reflecting
popular sentiment, Veja, a leading Brazilian weekly, headlined its
story on the sanctions as "The Empire Strikes Back."' 4 The
Brazilian government denounced the U.S. exercise in big power
unilateralism as illegal under GATT, claiming that the then-
existing version of the trade agreement required member countries
to arbitrate disputes through the GATT dispute settlement
machinery."5
The sanctions, and a change of government, succeeded in
changing Brazil's patent laws - though still not to U.S. satisfac-
tion. In 1990, when the neo-liberal government of new President
Fernando Collor de Mello agreed to revise its patent law to
provide for strong patent protections, the United States lifted the
sanctions." The 1990 agreement ameliorated the tension in the
United States-Brazil conflict, but it did not completely eliminate
the friction. The USTR placed Brazil on its priority watch list in
" See id. The Office of the USTR stated:
'The President declared his intention to take this action on July 22,
1988 at the conclusion of an unfair trade investigation under section
301 of our trade laws, following over two years of unsatisfactory
bilateral consultations,' [then-USTR] Clayton Yeutter said. 'Pharma-
ceutical and chemical companies have little motivation to invest in the
research and development of products important to mankind unless
they are assured that the right to market those products will be
safeguarded by patent protection. Patent piracy simply cannot go
unchallenged.'
Press Release From the Office of the United States Trade Representative on
President Reagan's Decision to Impose Trade Sanctions Against Brazil, FEDERAL
NEws SERVICE, Oct. 20, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
5' See Julia Michaels, U.S. Sanctions Over Drug Patents Brings Sharp Words
From Brazil, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 25, 1988, at 1 (quoting the
Veja article).
5' "Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brazilian foreign ministry's No. 2 official,
told a news conference that the sanctions are 'illegal, truculent, unjustified and
do not have the support of international law.'" William R. Long, Brazil Blasts
U.S.-Imposed Trade Sanctions as "Illegal" and "Unjustified". L.A. TImEs, Oct. 22,
1988, at 2.
56 See Hills Lifts $40 Million in Sanctions After Brazil Pledges to Enact Patent
Law, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 996-97 GJuly 4, 1990).
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1991 and 1992,sz and named Brazil one of the worst offenders of
intellectual property rights (a "priority foreign country") in
1993.58
With some variation, the USTR applied the same sort of
persistent pressure to the other countries designated as primary
infringers of U.S. companies' intellectual property. Thailand and
Taiwan both agreed to substantial changes in their patent laws,
largely because of U.S. pressure. 59 India and Argentina essential-
ly withstood the direct pressure from the USTR.
3.1.2. NAFTA
The inclusion of intellectual property protection in NAFTA
required that both Mexico and Canada change their patent laws.
These changes were resisted most strongly in Canada, which had
long maintained a compulsory licensing scheme.'
In 1987, Canada revised its Patent Act to provide patent
protection for seven to ten years before triggering its compulsory
licensing requirements.61 Although welcomed by the Canadian
and U.S. pharmaceutical companies at the time, those changes left
Canadian law far short of U.S. standards.62 NAFTA provided
an opportunity for the industry to address this shortfall. Indeed,
on February 4, 1993, Canada enacted Bill C-91, replacing its
compulsory system with a U.S.-style regime. 63
But this change only came after a long and bitter fight. That
fight was predictable, given the prevailing analysis that "[t]here's
one point everyone agrees on: The federal government's new
17 See USTR Cites India Taiwan, Thailand as Worst Intellectual Property
Offenders, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 784-85 (May 6, 1992).
1See Kantor Singles Out Brazil, India, Thailand/or Special 301 Designation,
10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 726 (May 5, 1993). The United States
insisted that Brazil's patent protections were too short, and complained about
working requirements and compulsory licensing provisions. See id.
59 See Peter Ungphakorn, Thais Pass Bill After American Patent Demands,
FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1992, at 3; Taiwan Strengthens Patent Laws to Help GA
Entry, Reuters, Dec. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
60 See Kosterlitz, supra note 28, at 76.
61 See Act of Nov. 19, 1987, ch. 41, 1987 S.C. 1171 (Can.).
62 See id.
63 See Patent Act Amendments Receive Royal Assent, Canada NewsWire, Feb.
4, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
1080 [Vol. 17:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss4/2
TRIPS A GREEMENT
patent plan will raise drug prices."" Estimates of the cost to
Canadian consumers of passage of C-91 ranged as high as seven
billion Canadian dollars over a twenty-year period.65 In the face
of these estimates of skyrocketing prices, the industry promised
that, if the bill were passed, it would invest an additional $530.6
million in research in Canada, raising its percentage of profits
devoted to research from eight to ten.66
Opponents of the patent law reform included the then-
opposition Liberal Party, the Canadian generic drug industry,
consumer advocates, health activists, and all of the country's
provincial governments. 7 They harped on the expected cost of
the change.68 Opponents also emphasized the consequences of
Canada's previous stronger patent policy enacted in 1987: drug
costs had risen; only approximately 400 of the 3,000 new research
jobs promised by the industry had been created; little basic drug
research took place in Canada; and Canada had gained little ability
to manufacture the active ingredients of drugs. 69 Opponents
lobbied hard and undertook a substantial public education effort,
but their efforts fell for naught.7' The Conservative Party then
held an absolute majority in Parliament, rendering the result of
the fight predetermined once the government committed itself to
Bill C-91.71 The generic industry also unsuccessfully sought to
prevent enactment of C-91 by legal action, claiming it violated the
1987 Patent Act's provision precluding further revisions to the
" Ian Austen, Side Effects Unknown: Estimates of Cost, Real Impact of New
Law Vary Wildly, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 6, 1992, at A7.
65 See id.
66 See Canadian C-91 Goes to the Senate, MARKETLETTER, Dec. 21, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
67 See Shawn McCarthy, Provinces Try Last-Ditch Plea to Halt Drug Bill,
TORONTO STAR, Nov. 18, 1992, at A10. In Canada's highly decentralized
governing system, the provinces are largely responsible for running the health
care system, and it is the provinces who will be forced, in significant part, to
bear whatever increased costs attach to C-91. See id.
68 See id.
69 See Ian Austen, Few Benefits from 1987 Drug-Patent Changes: Study;
Despite Report, Ottawa Moves to Further Reduce Competition in Pharmaceutical
Industry, GAZETTE (Montreal), Sept. 17, 1992, at E3.
70 See Canada's Bill C-91Almost There, PHARMACEUTICAL BUS. NEWs, Dec.
18, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
71 See id.
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country's patent law for a ten-year period. 2
All parties saw the passage of C-91 as a victory for the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry, and one orchestrated by the industry as
well. The Canadian industry is effectively a subset of the U.S.
industry. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association ("PMA")
of Canada is a mere fief of the U.S. PMA. Among the "Canadi-
an" companies pledging to increase their Canadian research if C-91
passed were: Marion Merrell Dow, Merck Frosst Canada, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, Pfizer Canada, Eli Lilly Canada, and Upjohn. 7
It seemed clear that the U.S. companies were able to advance their
interests through their branch operations and subsidiaries in
Canada. These companies also lobbied from the U.S. side of the
border. One manifestation of the U.S. industry's influence
appeared in a letter to then-USTR Carla Hills from the Intellectu-
al Property Committee, a coalition of thirteen major US.
companies including DuPont, Merck, Pfizer, IBM, General
Electric, and General Motors.74 The letter included negotiating
instructions and specific demands for inclusions in NAFTA to
satisfy industry.7 The letter was leaked in Canada, sparking
outrage.76 The success of the U.S. industry in securing patent
provisions in NAFTA was perhaps best summarized by Edgar G.
Davis, former vice president of Eli Lilly and now professor at
Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.7 Davis
boasts that putting the patent provisions in NAFTA was "'a
master stroke, [demonstrating] what an industry that has its act
together can accomplish.' 78
3.1.3. The GATT Attack
The industry's success through 301 actions and NAFTA were
critically important. It was able to set an example by targeting
the most prominent opponents of alternative pharmaceutical
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See Linda Diebel, How U.S. Drug Lobby Put New Patent Law Atop
Canada's Agenda, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 6, 1992, at Al.
75 See id.
76 See id.
' See Milt Freudenheim, Canadians See Rise in Drug Costs, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1992, at Dl.
78 Id.
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patent regimes. But the one-country-at-a-time approach also had
significant drawbacks for the industry, the most obvious of which
was that it was inefficient. There are far too many countries with
lucrative pharmaceutical markets to approach individually. If
pharmaceutical companies' intellectual property was truly going
to be protected on a global basis, some kind of comprehensive
agreement would be necessary.
GATT was not the most obvious place for fashioning such an
agreement. The existing international agreements on intellectual
property, the Paris Convention on patents79 and the Berne
Convention on copyrights,"0 are administered by the United
Nations-affiliated World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO). 1 Third World countries strongly favored WIPO
negotiations over revision to international intellectual property
obligations.12  They noted that the WIPO had traditionally
handled such matters.8 3 Furthermore, Third World countries felt
that they would exercise greater influence in WIPO negotiations
than they would in GATT.84  The United States insisted,
however, that the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations include
intellectual property.8 5 This point continued to be disputed into
the negotiations, with Chile' asserting as late as 1990 that intellec-
tual property standards are themselves neutral and that all
substantive proposals on intellectual property made in GATT
should be forwarded to WIPO.86 Nonetheless, the U.S. insis-
tence on confining the negotiations to GATT prevailed, and the
WIPO alternative faded as the Uruguay Round negotiations
'" See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14,
1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 21 U.S.T. 1583.
8" See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
July 1, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 22.
81 See id. art. 1 (referencing the WIPO).
82 See Craig Edgar, Note, Patenting Nature: GA TT on a Hot Tin Roof, 34
WASHBURN L. J. 76, 98 n.54 (1994)
83 See id.
"' See Jean M. Dettmann, GA TT. An Opportunity for an Intellectual Property
Rights Solution, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAW J. 347, 356 (1991) (explaining that in
WIPO, each nation has a vote and Third World Countries outnumber
developed countries, whereas GATT relies on a "consensus" framework giving
developed countries more leverage).
" See Robert Weissman, Patent Plunder: TRIPping the Third World,
MULTINATIONAL MONrrOR, Nov. 1990, at 8.
86 See id. at 9.
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continued into the 1990s. 87 The United States also rejected out
of hand a Third World proposal to negotiate separate agreements
covering counterfeit goods and patents.8
Throughout the TRIPS negotiations, the United States
maintained a firm stance; for an agreement to be reached, other
countries would have to adjust to its position. 9 That position,
essentially calling for the world to adopt U.S.-style patent law,
was developed largely by the pharmaceutical industry, according
to the industry itself. The Intellectual Property Committee
("-PC") claimed to have "'played a key advisory role, at USTR's
request, in developing the official U.S. proposal on intellectual
property that the U.S. government tabled before the GATT
TRIPS working groups in October 1987.'"" The Committee
added in its promotional materials that its "'close relationship
with USTR and Commerce has permitted the IPC to shape the
U.S. proposals and negotiating positions during the course of the
negotiations.'"'
The overwhelming success of the pharmaceutical industry's
GATT effort was highlighted in 1992. Ironically, this occurred
even as the industry was threatening to oppose the TRIPS
Agreement. The source of the industry's frustration was the
proposal for a ten-year transition period for Third World nations
to develop full-fledged strict patent regimes.92 The industry's
87 See id.
88 See id.
81 See GA T. U.S. Proposal on Intellectual Property Is Presented to GA TT,
Gets Mixed Reviews, 7 Int' ITrade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 680 (May 16, 1990)
(detailing a United States proposal encouraged by other industrialized countries
and criticized by Third World countries).
90 Weissman, supra note 85, at 8.
91 Id.
9' See, e.g., Harvey E. Bale, Jr., New GA 77 Draft Text is a Potential Step
Backwardfor Intellectual Property R is, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 6, 1992,
at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (criticizing the lenient
nature of the transition rules).
This criticism of the TRIPS agreement often focuses on the various
economic and non-economic harms purportedly caused by the continuing
opportunity for international piracy over the ten-year transition period:
The December 20 TRIPS text, while containing a number of both
positive and negative elements, is critically defective because it would:
(1) allow at least another decade of theft of U.S. pharmaceutical and
other innovations; (2) give pharmaceutical pirates in Argentina, Brazil,
Thailand, Hungary, India, and other developing nations grounds for
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vociferous opposition to a ten-year transition period" obscured
how much it had won. It had completely seized control of the
terms of the debate. The disputed issue was no longer whether
the rest of the world should or would adopt strict patent rules,
but when it would. Third World advocates of alternative patent
policies had largely silenced their criticisms of the U.S. demands.
Their silence reflected domestic political changes; a decision to
make sacrifices in the TRIPS text in exchange for purported
benefits elsewhere in GATT; and, critically, the fact that the
global intellectual and political climate had changed, making it
much harder to argue for alternative patent schemes than it had
been ten years earlier.
3.2. The Conceptual Offensive: Framing for Victory
Relying on the studies it had funded over the years, the
industry was able to gather an impressive set of data and argu-
ments to make two powerful claims about the importance of
patent protection.94 First, it contended that inadequate interna-
tional intellectual property protection costs U.S. manufacturers
billions of dollars in sales annually.9" No one estimated the cost
to the drug industry at anywhere near those levels, but the figure
was placed in the billions nonetheless. 6 The ITC study estimat-
ed the cost to ten drug manufacturers to be almost two billion
dollars in 1986, and pharmaceutical maker Merck estimated the
opposing early reforms that would stop piracy and encourage
investment and innovation in these countries; and, (3) continue to
foster for a decade the export from India, et al., of substandard and
counterfeit medicines that seriously harm consumers and the environ-
ment of the Third World - a subject of growing attention by the
World Health Organization ("WHO").
Id.
" This provision was eventually included in the final TRIPS Agreement.
See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
11 See Al Wyss, Patent Protection Winning New Round, CHEMICAL
MARKETING REP., Mar. 19, 1990, at SR22 (citing many of the studies used by
the industry).
9s A widely cited study (the "ITC study") by the International Trade
Commission ("ITC") placed the cost between $43 billion and $61 billion for
all intellectual property violations. This estimate included not only generic
drugs, but copyright violations like software copying and trademark infringe-
ments such as Rolex watch imitations. See id.
96 See id.
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cost to be six billion dollars annually for the entire industry.97
In an era of persistent and large U.S. trade deficits, these were
numbers large enough to make policy makers take notice.
Second, the industry made an impressive set of arguments
about the necessity of strong intellectual property protection in
fostering economic development.98 It argued that respecting
patent rights would actually benefit the Third World by encourag-
ing foreign and domestic investment in research and by enabling
high technology companies to engage in technology transfer with
Third World nations."
But however convincing these arguments, it was not their
merit which made it so difficult to defend genuine alternative
approaches to patent policy by the early 1990s.'0 Rather, that
depended crucially on the ability of the pharmaceutical industry
and its allies in the U.S. government01 to frame the debate on
their terms.
3.2.1. Rights Talk
Characterizing patent protections as a kind of intellectual
property "right" was a first step in setting the terms of debate.
This characterization is of course not novel; patents, trademarks,
and copyrights have long been viewed as intellectual property
rights."2 This is evidenced, in part, by the common reference
to intellectual property rights by the acronym "IPR." °3 Nor is
the characterization, from a legal standpoint, startling or at all
surprising. Lawyers commonly understand that the holders of
government-authorized powers have "rights," without attaching
any particular moral force to the term.
97 See id.
9' See, e.g., Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of
Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, J. OF WORLD TRADE,
Oct. 1990, at 75, 77-81 (discussing a study funded by a grant from the PMA).
99 See id.
100 See infra Section 6 for a critique of the second set of arguments.
101 The period of time involved here is expansive enough to include officials
in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations.
102 See Robert Fredrico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF.
SOc. 237, 238 (1936) (consistently describing patents as a "right").
103 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Comment, Of Property Rules, Coase, and
Intellectual Property, 94 CoLuM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994) (referring consistent-
ly to "IPRs").
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In the debate over international patent policy, however, the
use of the term "right" exercised an important influence. As a
preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that while
"rights" may be commonplace in legal discourse, the allocation or
recognition of a right may nonetheless privilege certain actions or
relations. Characterizing something as a right tends to immunize
it from challenge both in practice and in the realm of ideas. To
transgress a right is to "violate" it, to commit a wrong. To define
something as a right is to remove it, more or less, from political
challenge. Even if it is not considered a "natural" right; in moral
terms, a right is supposed to be somewhat inviolate.
While rights talk may have the general effect in legal discourse
of elevating the defined conduct or relationship above politics,
that effect was particularly strong in the case of patent policy.
The vociferous insistence of industry and the U.S. government
assumed a moral character 4 This was an especially notable
accomplishment in light of the intangible nature of intellectual
property. Additionally, intellectual property is more obviously
a creation of the state than other sorts of property. Hence it
intuitively enjoys less of a moral right than other property claims.
At the practical level, one does not receive a patent until an
invention is certified by the state as new, useful, and
nonobvious." 5 This makes it unusually clear that the state
could choose not to grant the right at all. At the conceptual level,
patent rights evaporate after a set period.'06 Governments may
grant patents for longer or shorter periods, on conditions, or not
at all. The characterization of an inventor or producer's intellec-
tual property interest as a "right" works to obscure the contingent
nature of the patent.107
104 See infra Section 3.2.2.
0 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. S 101-103 (1994) (prescribing conditions for
patentability).
106 In part, this reflects the policy balancing embedded in the decision to
grant patents at all. See supra note 7 and accompanying discussion.
107 Put another way, imagine the debate was not about intellectual property
rights, but about intellectual property grants (or licenses or privileges). That
would cast the discussion in-an entirely different light. If the government is
granting something, it seems logical to permit the government to attach
conditions to it. A grant is discretionary as well, suggesting the government
has the power - and is morally entitled - to refuse to make the grant
altogether.
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3.2.2. Piracy
The dominant and most aggressive metaphor of the debate was
piracy. The pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. government
labeled generic drug companies which copied pharmaceuticals
patented in other countries "pirates."1 0 8  They denounced
countries that permitted drug copying as harboring pirates.
109
The pharmaceutical industry did not invent this metaphor,
which has been used for hundreds of years.1 But the pharma-
ceutical industry did use the metaphor more extensively, aggres-
sively, and successfully than any before. It became a term with
emotional content, rather than just descriptive purpose.
The piracy metaphor effectively changed a policy debate into
an absolutist moral drama. Theft is simply wrong, and theft by
violence is even worse. There is no room for a policy discussion
about the merits of piracy, nor any space for compromise in the
direction of pirates. Consider the stridency of C.L. Clemente, the
vice president-general counsel of Pfizer:
Why is it that another government can base a policy of
helping the consumers in their country to steal foreign-
owned technology?
If we went back to the days when countries engaged in
piracy, wouldn't it have been ludicrous to say, 'Well,
Brazil owes the United States a great deal of money, so we
cannot stop their pirates from boarding our ships because,
after all, they obtain a great deal of revenue from this, and
gold and silver, et cetera.' Obviously, that's absurd. It's
really not too different when we're talking about intellec-
108 See C.L. Clemente, A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective, in INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE
127, 132-33 (Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1988).
109 See id. Some Third World development activists and their allies in
industrialized countries reverse the metaphor by labeling pharmaceutical
company attempts to patent genetic strains cultivated by Third World farmers
and herbalists as "biopiracy." See Hope Shand, Patenting the Planet, MULTINA-
TIONAL MONITOR, June 1994, at 9; see also infra Section 3.2.3. (discussing the
author versus source distinction).
110 See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 161, 163 (1822) (describing
an alleged use of the Hopperboy, a flour manufacturing machine, as "pirating").
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tual property; that kind of stealing is just as bad."'
Similarly, when the PMA voiced its opposition to a ten-year
phase-in for the strict GATT patent requirements, association
representatives decried the effort to provide a "long 'grace period'
for piracy."
1 12
3.2.3. Author Versus Source
Professor James Boyle suggests another metaphor underlying
the patent policy debate: the figure of the romantic author as
inventor and creator, someone with a right to make a property
claim because of the original contribution she has made to general
knowledge.1 The PMA has not claimed for itself authority
conferred by Shakespeare, but it is highly cognizant of the
principle enunciated by Professor Boyle. In fact, in 1994, the
PMA changed its name to the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America."' This critical move emphasizes the
originality and unique contribution of member companies'
research. The emphasis on their research efforts - as opposed to
the "imitative" or pirating techniques11 of their generic competi-
tors - is a moral claim, a means to defend high drug prices in the
United States and to justify the demand that other nations adopt
U.S.-style patent laws. 6 This distinction serves as the basis for
the normative "author versus source" dichotomy that the PhMRA
attempts to exploit.
Perhaps the most illuminating application of Professor Boyle's
author versus source distinction is in the context of Third World
biological resources patenting. Most of the world's biodiversity
is located in the Third World, particularly in tropical and semi-
... Clemente, supra note 109, at 132-33.
112 Bale, supra note 92, at 12.
11 See James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyrigh Spleens,
Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1510 (1992).
114 See supra note 30.
115 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The
Need for Improved Patent Protection Worldwide, 2 J. OF L. & TECH. 307, 307
(1987) ("There are two kinds of pharmaceutical companies: research-based
companies and imitators that do not carry out substantial research on their
own but profit from the fruits of the research of others.").
16 Whether the claim to originality is fully justified is addressed in the
public versus private discussion, see infra section 3.2.4.
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tropical regions. 11  Only a relatively small fraction of that
biodiversity has been categorized and studied, and scientists are
increasingly coming to believe that it may contain the ingredients
for a wide array of life-saving medicines.'18 Accordingly, multi-
national pharmaceutical corporations are increasingly surveying
plant life in Third World regions to locate genes that can form the
basis for new drugs. 9 Although naturally occurring substances
are not patentable, the pharmaceutical companies are able to
synthesize chemical substances with mild alterations and patent
them.120
The image of the adventurous pharmaceutical company
explorer-genetic prospector superficially suggested by the corpo-
rate effort to survey Third World genetic resources is inaccurate.
Company representatives do not wander into the rain forest
jungle to collect samples. Instead, corporate botanists and
anthropologists rely on Third World farmers and herbalists,
especially from indigenous communities that make their home in
or live off of the rain forest, to direct them to plants that they use
in local medicines. 121 Over centuries, these farmers and herbal-
ists have identified, cultivated, bred, and protected the plant
varieties.' 22  These informal innovations are not patentable,
however, because they are not "new."1" More obviously, a
Kayapo farmer in Brazil and a Sakai herbalist in Indonesia have
no practical means to patent their innovations.
Permitting drug companies to patent company contributions,
and the legal inability of the Third World innovators to patent
their contributions, Boyle suggests, illustrates the power of the
romantic author impulse in patent law.124
The chemical company's scientists fit the paradigm of
.17 See Shayana Kadidal, Note, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical Patents,
103 YALE L. J. 223, 224 n.8 (1993).
11 See id. at 223 n.3.
119 See Klaus Basselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime
Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT. L. & POL'Y
111, 117 (1996).
20 See Kadidal, supra note 118, at 237-43.
121 See Shand, supra note 110, at 10-11.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See Boyle, supra note 114, at 1529.
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authorship. The farmers are everything that authors
should not be: their contribution comes from a communi-
ty rather than an individual, tradition rather than an
innovation, evolution rather than transformation. Guess
who gets the intellectual property right?125
The Third World farmers and herbalists' contribution is thus
denigrated. The author versus source metaphor condemns them
as merely an adjunct of the source, the indigenous plants.1 26 It
further shapes a substantial portion of patent allocations for the
industry."
Recognition of this reality undermines the pharmaceutical
companies' moral claim to strict patent rules in every country.
Furthermore, calling attention to the Third World's unacknowl-
edged contribution to the development of pharmaceuticals also
raises the possibility of alternative approaches to patent policy.
3.2.4. Public Versus Private
The public versus private distinction pervades patent law.12 1
Inventions already in the public domain cannot be patented,
because they fail the novelty test. 129  At the same time, one of
the motivating rationales of the patent system is to bring knowl-
edge from the private domain into the public by offering
protections to private creators. 130  Furthermore, one of the
conceptual tensions in patent law is reflected in the determination
of whether patents should be issued for inventions building on
125 Id.
126 See Shand, supra note 110, at 11.
12 See id. at 11 ("An estimated three-quarters of all plant-derived prescrip-
tion drugs were discovered as a result of their prior use in indigenous medicine.
The annual world market value of these medicines is estimated at $43 billion
128 "[E]very dispute about property rights in information resolves itself into
a dispute about whether the issue 'is' in the public or the private realm." Boyle,
supra note 114, at 1435.
129 See, e.g., Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit's Patent
Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes,
85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1051, 1051 (1991) (citing provisions of U.S. patent law,
including 35 U.S.C. S 102 (1988)).
13 See J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to Intellectual Property
Protection: An Empirical Investigation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 209, 210 (1987).
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information already in the public domain.13'
What is defined as public and what is defined as private is thus
an ultimate issue of patent law. It is in the pharmaceutical
companies' interest to define the biological resources of the Third
World as "the common heritage of mankind." 13 2  That makes
the resources public, and thus unpatentable. If the biological
resources are not patentable, then Third World countries are
basically unable to capture any of the wealth-producing benefits
of their industrial development.133
The pharmaceutical industry, however, is far less generous in
its understanding of the public domain with regard to industrial-
ized countries. For example, the U.S. government spends billions
annually on biomedical research.1 4  Thus, government-funded
research often provides the platform for industry to conduct its
own research. Furthermore, government-funded research often
leads to the discovery of new drugs which are exclusively licensed
to private companies, or sometimes slightly modified and
patented. 3 A generous conception of the "public" nature of
"3 For example, under a "labor theory of property rights" there is a strong
incentive to accord patent protection to the development of a useful invention
from a publicly known but undeveloped source. See John R. Thomas, The
Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L. J.
35, 78 (1995).
132 See id. at 228 n.35 (discussing the origins of this phrase).
133 See id. at 224 ("Little or none of [the profits] go to the countries where
these naturally occurring compounds were oriinally found."). Contrast this
case to other sorts of resources, such as oil, where geographic location
determines ownership.
134 The total federal allocation for research and development in fiscal year
1993 was $76 billion. See Chris Lewis, Public Assets, Private Profits: Federal
R&D and Corporate Graft, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, January/February
1993, at 8. That amount represented 46% of the total national expenditure,
public and private, on research and development. See id.
13 See id. The quintessential example of this point is AZT, one of the few
drugs available to relieve conditions associated with the Human Immunodefi-
ciency Virus ("HIV") and resulting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS"). AZT was developed in federal government laboratories. See id.
Burroughs Wellcome, the British company which eventually acquired exclusive
control over the drug, contributed little money to the drug's development. See
id. The company only became interested after the National Cancer Institute
had identifiec[AZT as an effective agent in curbing the advance of AIDS among
HIV-positive patients. See id.
Consider also the remarkable findings of the Washington, D.C.-based
Taxpayer Assets Project ("TAP"):
For example, in a study presented in February 1993, TAP
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drugs developed with a large dose of government funding could
undermine the pharmaceutical companies' patent claims.
There is no escaping the private-public distinction in patent
and intellectual property law. Certainly the pharmaceutical
industry understands, at least implicitly, how to manipulate the
distinction to its advantage. Consciously focusing on how this
distinction plays a key role in the allocation of intellectual
property "rights" should highlight the alternatives available to
policy makers in providing either more or fewer protections to
different parties.
examined the federal government's role in the development of all FDA
approved cancer [figiting] drugs that were discovered since 1955, and
found that 34 of the 37 cancer [fighting] drugs were developed with
significant federal support.
Earlier this year, TAP presented a study of all "priority" drugs
approved by the FDA from 1987 to 1991. During this 5 year period
the FDA issued 2,270 drug approvals, but most were for generic drugs
or new combinations of existing compounds. Only 117 of the new
drug approvals involved so called "New Molecular Entities" (NMEs)
.. drugs distinctly different in composition from drugs already on the
market. Of these 117 NMEs, only 30 were judged by the FDA to be
drugs that were used in the treatment of severe illnesses or to represent
a substantial gain in therapeutic value.
Of these 30 "important" new drugs approved by the FDA, 15
benefited from significant funding by the U.S. government. When one
considers the country where the drug was discovered the government's
role is even more important. Seventeen of the "important" new drugs
were discovered in the U.S. Of these drugs, 12 were developed with
significant government funding - that is, 71% were developed with
significant government funding.
The U.S. government spends an enormous amount of money on
health care research, and this investment has been very productive.
On the basis of our research, we have concluded that while the private
sector's R&D investments are also large, they tend to be directed at
the lower risk ventures, and often are directed at the development of
so called "me too" drugs, which do not represent significant improve-
ments in therapy, but rather are marginally different methods of
treating illnesses which represent large markets, measured by the
companies in the number of dollars they will receive from consumers.
James P. Love, Pharmaceutical Drug Pricing: Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Government Affairs, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HousE, July
27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (citations omitted).
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4. GATT AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
4.1. The WITO and the Promise of Forceful GATT Enforcement
In April 1994, the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations
concluded. 13 6 In December 1994, the U.S. Senate approved the
new GATT, paving the way for the agreement to take effect in
1995. 3
The Uruguay Round creates a new World Trade Organization
to administer and enforce the GATT agreements. 131 Under the
WTO, GATT member countries will be severely constrained
from violating the terms of any of the Uruguay Round agree-
ments, including the TRIPS Agreement.139
The WTO includes a powerful new dispute resolution
machinery to resolve disputes between GATT members about a
nation's adherence to the terms of the Uruguay Round agree-
ments' 4° Three-person dispute settlement panels, composed of
trade experts141 who meet in secret,1 issue decisions on wheth-
er a country's actions, laws, or regulations violate the terms of a
Uruguay Round agreement.4 3  Decisions of the dispute settle-
ment panels can be appealed to a standing seven-member Appel-
late Body.144
136 See generally JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & JOHANNA W. BURMAN, THE
URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT (1994) (detailing the long and complex
process of negotiations involved in the Uruguay Round).
137 See H.R. 5110, 103d Cong. (1994) (enacted) (evidencing the final
ratification of the Uruguay Round); see also Helene Cooper & John Harwood,
Major Shifts in Trade are Ensured as GA 7T Wins Key Senate Vote, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 2, 1994, at A12 (reporting on the Senate's approval of GATT).
131 See Final Act para. 1.
139 See generally Reitz, supra note 41 (discussing the new enforcement
procedures of the Uruguay ound); see also Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter Dispute
Settlement Understanding], Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226, app. 1 (specifically
listing the TRIPS agreement as a "covered agreement" under the understanding).
140 See Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. I.
141 See id. art. 8, para. 1.
142 See id. art. 2.
143 See id. art. 3.
144 See id. art. 17 (referring to the Appellate Body); see also Reitz, supra note
41, at 582-84 (discussing the significance of the Appellate Body). Although the
Appellate Body consists of seven members, only three members actually hear
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Dispute panel decisions, or Appellate Body decisions in the
instance of an appealed case, are final unless every WTO Member
nation - including the complaining country - agrees to reject the
panel or Appellate Body's recommendation. 14  This "reverse
consensus" requirement turns past GATT practice on its head by
eliminating the de facto veto which member nations maintained
under the old GATT dispute settlement process' and gives
every WTO signatory the unilateral power to force adoption of
any panel or Appellate Body decision. 47
If the losing party declines to revise its laws to make them
consistent with the panel's interpretation of WTO rules, then it
must either agree to pay perpetual compensation negotiated with
the prevailing party or face trade sanctions imposed by the
prevailing party."' Trade sanctions are to be of an amount
equivalent to the value of market access lost by the prevailing
party due to the practices found WTO-illegal, but may be levied
against any industrial sector.
1 49
This complicated dispute settlement mechanism is likely to
apply severe pressure on countries to alter patent or other laws
found by a dispute settlement panel to be WTO-illegal. Potential
sanctions are likely to be large, especially from the viewpoint of
poor Third World nations. The threat of "cross-sectoral retalia-
tion" - the imposition of sanctions against a different economic
sector than the one in which the WTO-illegal law exists 50 -
will be particularly coercive. It raises the possibility that domestic
lobbies in unrelated industries would emerge to oppose laws or
any given appeal. See Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 17.
145 See id. art. 16, para. 4. This entire body is referred to as the Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB"). See id.
146 See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by
Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L.
359, 363-65 (1996) (discussing the "de facto" veto power that the losing party
enjoyed under the previous system).
147 See Reitz, supra note 41, at 585-86 (discussing this "ingenious" method
of international enforcement).
14' See Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 22, para. 2.
149 See id. art. 22, para 4.
150 Cross-sectoral retaliation is expressly permitted in the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. See id. art. 22, para. 3(c). For example, if the
United States successfully challenges Thailand's patent law, and Thailand refuses
to repeal the law, the United States could levy sanctions not just on the Thai
pharmaceutical industry, but on Thai textile imports. See id.
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regulations found WTO-illegal.151 These lobbies would repre-
sent industries that would feel the pain of WTO-authorized
sanctions but not reap the benefits of the laws giving rise to
sanctions. 12 Finally, WTO decisions are likely to give countries
the political legitimacy to impose more trade sanctions. Under
the prior regime, even the United States, which in the last fifteen
years has been rhetorically belligerent about imposing sanctions
against violators of international trade rules, has been significantly
constrained from doing so."53 This is part of the reason why
U.S. trade negotiators sought to strengthen the GATT dispute
settlement procedure and why they pointed to the final dispute
settlement agreement as a victory.154  The bottom line: it is
going to be far more difficult for countries - especially less
powerful countries - to maintain domestic laws in contravention
of GATT rules than it has been previously.
4.2. Patent Policy Alternatives Under TRIPS
Backed by its strong enforcement mechanism, the new GATT
unquestionably limits the patent policy options of national
governments in the Third World and the industrialized world
alike."15 The final TRIPS Agreement ultimately did mandate
adoption of U.S.-style patent laws - or so it seems at first
glance. 156  However, there are a number of exceptions and
loopholes which leave countries with substantial leeway, though
not as much as they had before the TRIPS Agreement, to
1"1 Some commentators have even speculated about the effects that private
lobbies could have on the WTO process itself. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz,
Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996).
152 For example, assume a WTO panel determined that French subsidies to
grape growers were violations of GATT principles in a complaint brought by
the United States. The United States, consistent with new GATT principles,
could impose sanctions on cheese imports from France. Cheese exporters in
France would obviously lobby against the grape growing subsidies since they
receive no benefit but would be damaged by the sanctions.
153 See Overview of the Results of the Uruguay Round: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Tranp., 103d Cong. 9 (1995)
(statement of Hon. Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative).
154 See id.
155 Article 66 of the TRIPS agreement provides for a 10-year transition
period for least developed countries. They will not have to comply with the
terms of the agreement until 2005. See TRIPS Agreement art. 66.
156 See id.
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experiment with different patent schemes.
Section 5 of the TRIPS Agreement covers patent rules in
Section 5, the core of which is Article 27 and 28. sz Article 27
defines patentable subject matter."5 8 It provides, "[p]atents shall
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application."" 9
Article 27 also requires that patent rights be conferred "without
discrimination as to place of invention, field of technology, or
whether the products are imported or locally produced.""6
Article 28, Paragraph 1, defines the rights conferred by a patent:
A patent shall confer on its owner the following
exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to
prevent third parties not having his consent from the
acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing for these purposes that product;
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to
prevent third parties not having his consent from the
act of using the process, and from the acts of: using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purpos-
es at least the product obtained directly by that pro-
cess.
16 1
On their face, Articles 27 and 28 appear to preclude most of
the alternatives to strict patent regimes implemented or considered
by Third World countries in the last several decades. The
157 See id. arts. 27-28.
158 See id. art. 27.
159 Id. art. 27, para. 1. A footnote to the article establishes that "the terms
'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial application' may be deemed by a
Member to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful'
respectively." Id. n.5.
160 Id. art. 27.
161 Id. art. 28, para. 1 (citation omitted). Article 29 establishes the
reciprocal conditions on patent applicants: they must 'disclose their invention
in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out
by a person skilled in the art . . . ." d. art. 29, para. 1.
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requirement that signatories grant patents for "any inventions...
in all fields of technology" that are new, useful and non-obvious
clearly encompasses pharmaceuticals, making the strategy of
excluding pharmaceuticals from patent protection altogether
GATT-illegal. The Agreement specifically requires coverage of
both products and processes, precluding countries from establish-
ing regimes which recognize only one or the other. Article 33
requires that patent protection be afforded for twenty years from
the date of filing, preventing countries from tinkering with the
length of patents in order to calibrate the longitudinal strength of
the monopoly they confer.6 2 Article 28's strict limitations on
third parties' use of patents in the absence of the patent holders'
consent seems to eliminate the possibility of compulsory licensing
schemes.'63 Article 27's requirement that patent rights be
enjoyable without regard to whether products are imported or
locally produced precludes work-the-patent requirements.64
A comprehensive reading reveals, however, that special tax
schemes - as long as they are nondiscriminatory between
domestic and foreign producers - and price controls - again, so
long as they are nondiscriminatory - are not precluded by the
core elements of the Agreement. 65
Despite apparent narrowing of the patent policy alternatives
open to Third World countries, the TRIPS Agreement also
contains a number of exceptions arguably reopening opportunities
seemingly foreclosed by the provisions discussed above. There are
three relevant exceptions explicitly stated in the TRIPS Agree-
162 See id. art. 33.
163 See id. art. 28. Indeed the terms are so all-inclusive that some generic
drug makers have complained that it will prevent all development of
production processes for pharmaceuticals going off patent until after the patent
expires, effectively adding years to the length of time over which the patent
holder will maintain a monopoly over the patented product. See Generic Drug
Industry Under Pressure on Several Fronts, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. NEWS, June
26, 1992, at 4 (Article 28 "'will add about five years of effective patent life' (two
years of product development and three years for regulatory approval)"
according to Wayne Schnarr, research director of the Canadian Drug Manufac-
turers Association).
164 See supra section 2.2.5. (discussing work-the-patent requirements).
Obviously, a patent that is invalid unless developed or used in the domestic
countries does not fulfill this non-discriminatory requirement.
165 See generally TRIPS Agreement.
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ment,16 and one implied by the structure of the Agreement,
which should serve to preserve pharmaceutical patent policy
alternatives available to Third World policy makers.
The first exception is contained in Article 27. It permits
exclusion from patentability where necessary to protect public
health and the environment.1 67 Article 30 provides the second
exception, permitting members to provide limited exceptions to
patent exclusivity, contingent upon a showing that the interests of
the patent owner are not unreasonably infringed upon.68
Article 31 provides the third exception; it explicitly permits
compulsory licensing subject to a long list of restrictions." A
fourth exception, implicit in the Agreement's allowance of price
controls," ° effectively allows a government to impose price
controls or nondiscriminatory taxes and condition their waiver on
a patent holder's willingness to license its product or process on
a non-exclusive basis.
4.2.1. The Public Health Protection Provision
As referenced above, the TRIPS agreement contains a public
health exception:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions,
the prevention within their territory of the commercial
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public
or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environ-
ment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely
because the exploitation is prohibited by domestic law."'
By its terms, the public health exception permits countries to
166 A fourth, very important exception is not relevant to the discussion
here. The TRIPS agreement also provides that "diagnostic, therapeutic and
surgical methods for treatment of animals and humans," as well as "plants and
animals other than microorganisms" may be excluded from patentability. Id.
art. 27, para. 3.
167 See id. art. 27, para. 2.
16 See id. art. 30.
169 See id. art. 31.
170 See id. art. 40, para. 2.
171 Id. art. 27, para. 2.
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deny patents altogether where they have a legitimate health or
environmental reason to prevent the commercial exploitation of
an invention. Assuming the reason is legitimate, the exception
will permit a country to deny a patent to a particular drug or to
all drugs.
However, the provision requires the denial of patentability to
be linked to a denial of commercial exploitation of the inven-
tion.172  This requirement substantially limits the scope of the
public health provision. It does not allow for either a no-patent
system where private corporations are free to produce and sell
generic drugs for profit or for compulsory licensing schemes.
Both of these systems implicitly contemplate commercial exploita-
tion. Nor would it allow for shorter patent terms, since although
they are designed to speed generic production of drugs and thus
lower overall drug prices, they too are based on expectations of
future commercial exploitation.1 73
Moreover, the public health provision offers no support to
work-the-patent requirements, which are designed to encourage
foreign investment and technology transfer. They are not
necessarily directly targeted at public health goals.
Still, the public health provision does offer at least one
important alternative to Third World countries. Capitalizing on
the provision, they could deny patentability for one or all drugs
and produce and distribute them non-commercially through a
state-owned marketing board, quasi-state entity, single non-profit
manufacturer, or system of non-profit manufacturers. Especially
for countries pursuing Essential Drugs programs, 74 this govern-
172 See id.
"' A further consideration questions whether compulsory licensing schemes
or shorter terms would qualify under the public health provision for yet
another reason - the provision speaks of excluding from patentability, not
conditioning patentability. An interesting argument could be formulated that
the exclusion of patentability necessarily permits the conditioning of patentabil-
ity - a kind of hierarchy of powers argument. Such an argument would be
irrelevant, however, in view of the preclusions presented by principles set forth
in the main text above.
174 Essential Drugs programs rely on a government registry of a core group
of essential drugs, which are made available in generic form at low prices. See,
e.g., John E.S. Parker, Pharmaceuticals and Third World Concerns: The Lall
Report and the Otago Study, in THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY OF MEDICINES:
IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. REGULATORY REFORM 135, 139 (Robert B. Helms ed.,
1980) (giving an example of the Indian essential drug policy). Mild Essential
Drugs programs can co-exist with for-profit sales of drugs. More aggressive
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ment/non-profit option may be attractive. In order to adopt a
policy of domestic, non-commercial exploitation, however, a
GATT signatory nation would have to overcome another hurdle:
the requirement that its actions be "necessary."
In recent years, GATT dispute settlement panels have created
a substantial jurisprudence interpreting GATT Article XX, which
provides for general exceptions to GATT rules.17 1 In the WTO
adjudicatory system, there is no formal system of stare decisis, but
relevant precedent nonetheless exerts strong persuasive influence
on current decisions.1 76 The interpretation of the TRIPS Article
27 is likely to be shaped in significant part by the doctrines
developed in prior GATT Article XX decisions, and analyzing the
scope of the TRIPS public health provision requires a review of
those decisions.' 7'
The first critical Article XX decision involved a European
Economic Community challenge to Section 337 of the U.S. Trade
Act of 1930." s That act established an optional procedure for
U.S. patent holders to bring legal action against foreign persons or
corporations allegedly exporting to the United States products
versions may involve a ban altogether on sales of non-listed drugs. See DIANNA
MELROSE, BITTER PILLS: MEDICINES AND THE THIRD WORLD POOR 148
(1982). The listed drugs are often produced by domestic generic makers, but
could be produced by government or non-profit entities. See id. at 153.
's See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XX(b) [hereinafter GATT]. The
provision states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures: ... (b) necessary to protect
human, animal or pant life or health ....
Id.; see also Reitz, supra note 41, at 569 n.63 (discussing a case between the
United States and Canada concerning resolution of Article XX issues).
176 See Pierre Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute
Settlement, in 1 PIERRE PESCATORE, ET AL., HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT pt. 2, at 6, 23 (6th ed. 1995) (discussing the proper role
of stare decisis in past and future GATT decisions).
177 See id.
178 See Report of the Panel on United States: Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345-46 (1990) [hereinafter
Section 337 Panel Report].
1996] 1101
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
which infringed their patents.179  While a purely domestic
dispute over patent infringement would be heard in a federal
district court, the optional special procedure concerning alleged
foreign infringers involved a quasi-judicial hearing before an
administrative law judge of the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion. 8 ' This hearing varied in a variety of ways from federal
district court proceedings."'
The then-EEC attacked the procedures as a discriminatory
violation of GATT Article III,182 which requires equal national
treatment of imported goods."' The United States defended the
parallel ITC proceedings on several grounds. One of these was
Article XX(d), permitting exceptions to GATT rules where
"necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement,
including ... the protection of patents."" 4  The United States
argued that the parallel enforcement procedure was necessary to
provide quick resolution and adequate sanctions against foreign
infringers who could not be satisfactorily targeted through
traditional civil remedies.' The GATT dispute resolution
panel rejected the U.S. argument with logic that has framed
subsequent Article XX cases.'86 First, the panel concluded that
Article XX provided exceptions to the general GATT rules, and
that panels should first analyze challenged practices for consisten-
cy with general GATT rules."' Article XX analysis should
ensue after a determination that certain conduct was a viola-
tion."' This conclusion establishes that "Article XX(d) thus
provides for a limited and conditional exception from obligations
under other provisions."" 9 In other words, Article XX should
171 See id. at 350.
180 See id.
"' See id. at 351. Domestic patent holders alleging foreign infringement
maintained the option of filing their case in federal district court. See id.
182 See GATT Art. IMl.
183 See Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 179, at 354.
184 GATT art. XX.
185 See Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 179, at 375.
186 See id. at 395.
187 See id. at 345 ("The Panel noted that Article XX is entitled 'General
Exceptions' . . ...
188 See id.
189 Id. at 385.
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be treated as a disfavored provision, with a special burden placed
on countries invoking it as a defense.
Second, and building on the first point, the Panel placed great
weight on the term "necessary" in Article XX:
It was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot
justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provi-
sion as 'necessary' in terms of Article XX(d) if an alterna-
tive measure which it could reasonably be expected to
employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT
provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases
where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions
is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to
use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that
which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other
GATT provisions. '90
Henceforth, the "least-trade-restrictive" alternative test has been
used. It is a very intrusive test in terms of impingement on
national sovereignty, and one destined to become a major source
of contention in the U.S. debate over the Uruguay Round
agreements. 91  It also seems clear that it is still part of
GATT/WTO jurisprudence. 92
" Id. at 392-93. The Panel sought to limit the sweep of its ruling by
stating:
The Panel wished to make it clear that this [the imposition of the
least-trade-restrictive test] does not mean that a contracting party could
be asked to change its substantive law or its desired level of enforce-
ment of that law, provided that such law and such level of enforce-
ment are the same for imported and domestically produced products.
Id. at 393. Thus the disputed principle in the Section 337 case was that of
nondiscrimination, not the substance of U.S. patent law.
19i The debate concerning GATT's impacts on U.S. sovereignty was
particularly potent when the U.S. Senate considered ratification of the Uruguay
Round. See Leonard Bierman, et al., The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade: World Trade from a Market Perspective, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 821,
825 (1996).
192 On January 17, 1996, the first panel decision rendered under the new
WTO machinery was produced. See Bhushan Bahree, WTO Panel Rules Against
U.S. in Dispute Over Gasoline Norms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996, at All. This
panel decision also relied on the "least-trade-restrictive" standard. See Office of
the United States Trade Representative, Panel Decision: Venezuela, Brazil,
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Third, and again reflecting its disfavor for Article XX based
defenses, the Panel determined that it was not enough for a
country to justify its entire challenged scheme as necessary."
"In the view of the Panel, what has to be justified as 'necessary'
under Article XX(d) is each of the inconsistencies with another
GATT article found to exist .... "1 94
The Section 337 case was an Article XX(d) case, involving a
measure purportedly necessary to enforce domestic laws. The
interpretive conclusions of the Section 337 Panel arguably did not
apply to Article XX(b) concerning the protection of human,
animal or plant life and health.
The possibility of applying distinct standards to Articles XX(d)
and XX(b) was rejected, however, in 1990, exactly one year after
the Section 337 case, in the Thai Tobacco case.19 The United
States sought to challenge Thailand's de facto ban on the importa-
tion of foreign tobacco. 96 Its tobacco excise system authorized
higher taxes on foreign-made cigarettes in the event they were
imported.197  It also included various tobacco industry regula-
tions, including a ban on tobacco advertising, that the United
States alleged to be discriminatory practices in violation of
GATT's general prohibition on quantitative restrictions of
imports as well as the Agreement's requirement of national
treatment. 98 The Panel determined that the Thai practices did
violate the referenced GATT provisions, and then considered
whether the Thai practices could be justified as public health
measures under Article XX(b).' 99
Most important in terms of establishing persuasive precedent,
the Thai Tobacco Panel imported the Article XX(d) analysis from
the Section 337 case into Article XX(b) analysis. Citing and
quoting the Section 337 case, the panel concluded that it "could
United States on the Rule Issued by the Environmental Protection Agency on 15
December 1993, Jan. 17, 1996, available in WESTLAW, GATT Database.
193 See Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 179, at 393.
'9' Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
195 See Report of the Panel on Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at
200 (1990) [hereinafter Thailand Tobacco Panel Report].
196 See id. at 204.
197 See id. at 203.
198 See id. at 211-12.
199 See id. at 221-22.
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see no reason why under Article XX the meaning of the term
'necessary' under paragraph (d) should not be the same as in
paragraph (b)."200 The Panel proceeded to adopt the Section 337
least-trade-restrictive-alternative test:
The Panel concluded from the above that the import
restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered to be
'necessary' in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no
alternative measure consistent with the General Agree-
ment, or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could
reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health
policy objectives. 2 1
The Panel rejected Thailand's argument that its restriction of
foreign tobacco imports and its conferral of a tobacco marketing
monopoly on a state company were "necessary" to control the
domestic supply of the public health menace of tobacco and to
prevent the importation of foreign cigarettes which contained
extra dangerous additives.0 2  Education campaigns, bans on
advertising and labeling requirements could all serve those goals
in a less restrictive manner, the Panel reasoned.2 3 It accepted
Thailand's claim that a nondiscriminatory ban on advertising did
not violate national treatment requirements; and, the Panel
concluded, even if it accepted the U.S. argument that the mainte-
nance of an advertising ban in the immediate aftermath of a prior
state monopoly on tobacco would discriminate against foreign
producers whose brand names were relatively unknown, such
discriminatory effect would be justified under Article XX(b).2°4
A subsequent panel again adopted a narrow reading of Article
XX(b) in a 1991 decision condemning U.S. restrictions on imports
of tuna not caught by dolphin-friendly methods.2' The Tuna-
200 Id. at 223.
201 Id.
202 See id. at 226.
201 See id. at 224.
204 See id.
205 See Report of the Panel on United States: Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. 39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter
Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report]. Because of the political controvers generated by
the Panel report - a controversy which threatened support or the North
1996] 1105
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j Int'l Econ. L.
Dolphin panel reiterated that Article XX permitted measures
inconsistent with GATT only "to pursue overriding public policy
goals to the extent that such inconsistencies were unavoid-
able."20 6 The Panel reasoned that rather than imposing import
restrictions, the United States should have sought to negotiate
international cooperative arrangements. 207 It also concluded that
the nature of the U.S. import restriction - which pegged the
permissible dolphin kill of foreign tuna exporters to the number
actually killed by U.S. tuna fishers (allowing the foreign fishers a
kill rate 1.25 times that of the U.S. fishers - was not consistent
with an Article XX(b) effort to protect animal health.2 8
If the Article XX(b) decisions are to stand as precedent for
Article 27, then a country seeking to invoke Article 27 would
have to be prepared to argue that there was no means less
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement available to achieve its
public health goals of providing affordable essential drugs to its
population. There should be little difficulty in demonstrating the
public health importance of providing essential drugs at an
affordable price. There is ample research showing the importance
of access to affordable drugs, and the WHO is a strong endorser
of Essential Drugs programs, a fact a WTO panel is likely to note
and defer to.2° But a government would also have to show that
no less inconsistent measure existing to accomplish this end. A
challenging party may argue that government subsidies of drugs
would accomplish the purpose, but given the potential cost of a
subsidy program, such an alternative would not be reasonably
available. Additionally, WTO panels cannot allow the subsidy
argument to defeat public health programs, because it would
swallow the entire public health provision of the TRIPS and the
GATT. For example, in the Thai tobacco case, given the foreign
company name recognition disadvantage, it would have been less
inconsistent with GATT principles for Thailand not to ban
advertising but to pay foreign tobacco companies not to advertise.
American Free Trade Agreement and the U rguay Round - the GATT
signatory parties did not adopt the report. See i.
206 Id. at 199.
207 See id. at 199-200.
208 See id.
209 Cf Thai Tobacco Panel Report, supra note 196, at 216 (asking for and
relying on opinions of WHO on health-related matters).
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No one could reasonably propose such a standard. A more
effective challenge to the non-commercial exploitation of drugs
would be a claim that price controls would be less restrictive.21°
Another viable approach is available for a country defending
a non-commercial exploitation policy from a least-trade-restrictive
challenge. Specifically, a country could argue that the Article YX
jurisprudence, despite the similarity in language and purpose, does
not apply to Article 27. The development of the least-trade-
restrictive test in the Article XX context was rooted in a concep-
tion of the Article as providing exceptions which were limited and
conditional.2 In contrast, Article 27, paragraph 2, is not an
exception; it is included in one of the core provisions of section
5, and it is part of the very definition of patentable subject
matter. 12 Thus the term "necessary" in Article 27 should not
be given the intrusive interpretation it has been in Article XX
GATT Panel decisions. A less stringent reading of "necessary" -
something closer to important, and with little or no attention to
available alternatives21  - is more appropriate in this con-
text.214  Under this more deferential standard, the defending
country would make the same arguments, and they would be
nearly sure-fire winners.
210 Indeed, if a patent holder were to agree to provide the desired drug at
marginal cost or below, this option should-satisfy the government - at least
insofar as it is motivated by legitimate public health concerns. Even while
pursuing a non-commercial exploitation strategy, a government could hope to
build up domestic technological know-how. But while this would be a worthy
goal, it would not be cognizable as a legitimate one for Article 27 purposes.
21 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
212 See TRIPS Agreement art. 27, para. 2.
213 Or perhaps alternatives should be considered, but so should the political,
institutional and' fiscal impediments to adoptingthose alternatives - a set of
factors GATT/WTO panels have heretofore refused to consider.
214 This word [necessary] must be considered in the connection in
which it is used, as it is a word susceptible of various meanings. It may
import absolute physical necessity or inevitability, or it may import
that which is only convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or
conducive to the end sought. It is an adjective expressing degrees, and
may express mere convenience or that which is indispensable or an
absolute physical necessity.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1029 (6th ed. 1990).
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4.2.2. Article 30: Exceptions to Rights Conferred
TRIPS Article 30 potentially provides for very broad excep-
tions to the patent requirements of the Agreement:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
taking account of the legitimate interests of third par-
ties.1
Unlike Article XX of the GATT or Article 27, paragraph 2, of
the TRIPS Agreement, Article 30 does not limit the purposes for
which a country may make exceptions to the Agreement. 6
Both public health purposes and a desire to promote local
industry are legitimate Article 30 purposes. This would seem to
authorize countries to undertake any of the range of patent policy
options.
However, although Article 30 does not condition exceptions
on national purpose, it does impose conditions on the right to
make exceptions to the overall Agreement.1 7 These conditions
are logical, because there is no evidence that Article 30 was
intended as an all-purpose opt-out from TRIPS patent rules. The
Article specifies three limitations. First, exceptions must be
"limited."21 1 Second, the exceptions cannot "unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent."2' 9 Third, the
exception must not "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner."' °
Quite obviously, none of these limitations are self-defining.
Whether they allow or preclude various patent policy alternatives
will turn on WTO panel interpretations of their meaning. The
215 TRIPS Agreement art. 30.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
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argument here is that these limitations should reasonably be
interpreted to preserve a broad range of exceptions under Article
30, and hence a broad range of pharmaceutical patent policy
alternatives for Third World nations.
The first limitation on the Article 30 mandates that any
exceptions must be limited.21 A strong case can be made that
the meaning of "limited" is defined within the Article, by the
subsequent "provided that such exceptions . . ." language. m In
other words, the subsequent, more precise conditions describe
what "limited" means in this precise context. The
counterinterpretation would hold that such a reading makes
"limited" superfluous, that it is intended to have independent
force. In support of this counterinterpretation, a country
challenging a Third World patent law could argue that Article 30
explicitly provides for exceptions, and one of the teachings of the
Article XX GATT Panel jurisprudence is that exceptions are to
be interpreted narrowly so as to preserve the broad integrity of
the core Agreement. m This argument carries some weight, but
is not decisive, because Article 30 does provide a potential internal
definition of "limited," while Article XX contains no such
definition of "necessary." 24  The merits of these arguments
appear about even.
Assume that the challenging country wins on this point, and
"limited" should be interpreted to mean something more than the
subsequent conditions in Article 30. "Limited" is still a term that
restricts scope, but to an indeterminate degree. It is not at all
apparent what sort of principled, substantive content can be given
to the term other than those of the subsequent conditions. If
"limited" is to have independent meaning, it must be that the
Article 30 exception is not meant to be used to defeat the TRIPS
Agreement on patents altogether. And at this level, every patent
policy option discussed in the paper survives, because they are
"limited" to the case of pharmaceuticals. They do not contem-
plate restrictions on patents in other fields.m
The second Article 30 limitation, that a patent exception not
221 See id.
2n Id.
2 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
14 Compare TRIPS Agreement art. 30, with GATT art. XX.
"25 This is not to argue that such restrictions might not be appropriate.
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unreasonably conflict with the owner's normal exploitation of
it,226 poses fewer problems for countries seeking alternative
pharmaceutical patent policies. Only a policy prohibiting a patent
holder from exploiting its patent - such as the government/non-
profit non-commercial proposal discussed in the context of the
public health provision 2 - would potentially run afoul of this
limitation. Even that proposal arguably would not "unreason-
ably" conflict with the patent owner's rights, but there is no need
to make such a case in view of the TRIPS-legality of such a policy
under the public health provision. All of the other options
discussed in this paper would allow the patent holder to exploit
the patent to whatever extent desired.
A nation challenging a Third World country's patent policy
could argue that "exploiting" a patent includes the right not to use
it or license it at all. This argument, however, would run
contrary to the common use of "exploitation" which means to
make use of, or to work up. 2 This argument would require
claiming that normal exploitation of a patent includes purposeful
non-exploitation of it. That interpretation is more than the
language can bear, since the drafters could have written "does not
unreasonably conflict with patent holder rights" in the place of
the exploitation clause had they intended to convey such a
meaning. Moreover, the very next clause speaks to the "legitimate
interests of the patent owner,"2 9 which would make the exploi-
tation clause redundant were it to have the broad meaning
required to include both exploitation and nonexploitation.
The third limitation - to not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the owner 230 - is really the crux of the
matter. This is especially true from the viewpoint of elaborating
TRIPS-legal pharmaceutical patent policy. Critically, this
limitation is itself limited, by a requirement to take into account
the legitimate interests of third parties. 31  In other words, it
calls for a balancing process. A valid policy must balance the
interests of patent-holding pharmaceutical companies in industrial-
226 See TRIPS Agreement art. 30.
227 See supra section 4.2.1.
228 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (6th ed. 1990).
22' TRIPS Agreement art. 30.
230 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
231 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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ized countries with the interests of Third World citizens and
domestic pharmaceutical companies.
There is a strong case to be made that, in view of the pervasive
government subsidies from which the industry benefits, the
"legitimate interests" of the industrialized country pharmaceutical
companies should be construed much more narrowly than the
industry asserts. 2 2  Third World countries seeking to invoke
Article 30 do not need to rest their case on this argument alone.
The equities of the balance lie heavily on the side of Third World
consumers, who are overwhelmingly poor and unable to afford
important drugs. Furthermore, unsanitary conditions and various
conditions associated with poverty make Third World citizens
more susceptible to illness than industrialized country consum-
ers. 3  The balance is further tipped in favor of permitting the
less restrictive patent policies by virtue of the fact that Article 30
arguably allows "prejudice" to the interests of the patent owner,
just not "unreasonable prejudice."
234
Thus, Article 30 should permit some of the patent policy
alternatives discussed in this paper, but it probably requires that
they be carefully calibrated so as not to unreasonably or excessive-
ly infringe patent holder rights." In this regard, shortening the
life of the patent for pharmaceuticals - as a means to promote the
more rapid diffusion of lower-priced generics - seems to pass
Article 30 muster, although exactly how much shorter patents
could be made is unclear. At some point, shortening would
arguably cross the threshold into "unreasonably prejudice"
territory. Compulsory licensing would also be permissible under
the balancing test - again to promote the diffusion of more
affordable drugs to a poor population - but may require a royalty
system to limit the degree of infringement of patent owners'
interests.
Work-the-patent requirements would be harder to justify
232 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
233 The interests of Third World domestic producers probably count for
little in the balance, since developing local industry is an only minimally
"legitimate" third party interest in Uruguay Round terms, if it is legitimate at
all.
" See Trips Agreement art. 30.
235 The adverb here is "unreasonably," not "unnecessarily," which suggests
a much less strict standard than the least-trade-restrictive interpretation of
Article XX.
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under Article 30, since they do not directly advance the public
health interest in lower drug prices, but they too may be
permissible. An argument on behalf of work-the-patent require-
ments would rest on two grounds. First, that promoting
technology transfer is a legitimate interest of a third party, namely
the country beneficiary of the transfer. Second, to the extent that
work-the-patent requirements succeed at technology transfer and
building up the domestic scientific base, they bring countries
closer to developing their own independent research capacity.
These research capacities could be directed to addressing local
diseases for which the treatment, prevention, or cure does not
hold out the prospect of sufficient profit to draw the interest of
industrialized country pharmaceutical companies. That is, the
argument would be that there is an indirect public health interest
in work-the-patent requirements.
Article 30 would not permit a no-patent system. Even if such
a system could be justified under the "unreasonable prejudice"
clause, Article 30 only allows for exceptions "to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent,"fl6 meaning the patent itself must
initially be granted.?7
4.2.3. Article 31: Other Use Without Authorization of
the Right Holder (Compulsory Licensing)
Article 31 specifically authorizes countries to undertake
compulsory licensing schemes, contingent upon meeting a series
of provisions. 8  These conditions include:239  (a) authorization
for compulsory licensing must be considered on the individual
236 TRIPS Agreement art. 30.
237 Note that this requirement does not affect the other alternatives
discussed here. Compulsory licensing is clearly a limitation on patent
exclusivity. For Article 30 purposes, so are work-the-patent and shorter terms
provisions; work-the-patent provides for an exception to patent exclusivity
where a patent holder does not use the patent as part ofa manufacturing
process in the granting country, and "shorter patent terms - at least if
properly drafted - provide for an exception to patent exclusivity at the end of
a patent term.238See TRIPS Agreement art. 31. The existence of specific authorization
for compulsory licensing in Article 31 does not preclude a compulsory licensing
program under Article 30. Article 31 explicitly does not displace Article 30,
but creates alternatives to member countries in addition to those made available
under Article 30. See TRIPS Agreement art. 31, n.7.
" The lettering here tracks the lettering in Article 31.
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merits; (b) the licensee must have "made efforts to obtain
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial
terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been success-
ful within a reasonable period of time;" (c) the scope and duration
of the license can only be for specifically authorized purposes; (d)
"such use shall be non-exclusive;" (e) the license must be non-
assignable; (f) the use of the license must be predominantly for the
supply of the domestic market; (g) the license must "be terminated
if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and
are unlikely to recur"; (h) "the right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into
account the economic value of the authorization;" and (i) and (j)
the compelling of the license and the amount of remuneration
must be open to judicial review.24
Most of these provisions pose little problem for the operation
of an efficient compulsory licensing scheme. Provision (a) would
require a government agency to oversee the compulsory licensing
scheme, even where it maintained a strong presumption that it
would require licensing for most drugs. This may add unneces-
sary bureaucracy, but it would not essentially impede a compulso-
ry licensing program. It would provide the benefits of individual-
ized review, enabling the government to permit exclusive
production by the patent holder for "orphan drugs" - those
which treat illnesses that do not occur in significant enough
numbers to merit drug company involvement in the absence of a
right to charge especially high prices.
Provision (b) should be cause only for minimal delay. The
potential problem in provision (b) - determination of reasonable
commercial terms - will be a consequence of the background
understanding of adequate remuneration under provision (h). It
does not by itself pose any additional difficulties for a compulsory
licensing program. Provisions (c), (d), and (e) should pose no
particular difficulties in the pharmaceutical context.
Similarly, provision (g) seems likely to have little restrictive
effect on compulsory licensing schemes for pharmaceuticals. The
circumstances giving rise to the compulsory scheme - poverty,
high incidence of disease, etc. - are not likely to cease any time
soon. And the judicial review required by provisions (i) and ()
should pose few problems, either.
240 See id.
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Provision (f), however, while not fatal to a well-run compulso-
ry licensing regime, creates substantial difficulties. Generic
manufacturers can lower their marginal costs by expanding their
demand pool, that is, by selling in other countries. And a
rationally configured compulsory licensing scheme in many
regions of the Third World might rely heavily on a common
market approach, so that the countries of, for instance, East Africa
would develop an integrated compulsory licensing and generic
drug manufacturing and marketing approach. Provision (f)'s
requirement that use be "predominantly" for domestic use seems
to preclude the full elaboration of such an approach.
The critical potential obstacle to adoption of a compulsory
licensing program under Article 31 is provision (h), requiring
adequate remuneration be paid to involuntary patent licensors.
What constitutes adequate remuneration? Provision (h) says only
that "the economic value of the authorization" must be taken into
account. But there is no single economic value of an involuntary
license. As a general matter, the license will be worth more to
the involuntary grantor - who is thereby forced to sacrifice
monopoly profits - than it is to the nonexclusive grantee - who
will only be able to earn competitive profits. The question then
becomes: in the absence of any independent means to establish a
level of adequacy, whose version of the economic value of the
authorization should control the meaning of adequate remunera-
tion? The TRIPS text does not provide an answer, but logic
suggests the answer must be the value to the grantee. Where the
value is set at the grantor's valuation, the patent holder would
willingly grant the license without compulsion, and there would
be no need for Article 31. In other words, defining adequate
remuneration at the level of the involuntary grantor's valuation
would swallow up Article 31 altogether.24'
4.2.4. Price Controls and Compulsory Licensing
The TRIPS Agreement does not mention price controls, which
remain legal under the Uruguay Round agreements as long as they
241 I do not here consider what the value of the license is to the grantee,
but it should be set at a level to allow the grantee reasonable profits. The
royalty formula could be attached to the grantee's profit margin, or to gross
saes.
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are administered in a non-discriminatory manner.242  In some
cases, a government may find that price controls work well. But
in many instances price controls are an unsatisfactory policy
instrument, from the perspective of all players. Patent holders
characterize price controls as severe and arbitrary, and sometimes
more costly than compulsory licensing schemes. 243 Further-
more, price controls are difficult for governments to administer,
since they often require extensive investigation and negotiation
with patent holders. Additionally, the inherent uncertainty of the
enterprise is exacerbated because industry-provided data are
somewhat suspect. Depending on implementation, price controls
may be less beneficial to consumers, who, at least with some
drugs, may find themselves paying higher prices than they would
under an alternative scheme such as compulsory licensing.
Furthermore, price controls do not benefit local, generic produc-
ers, who do not gain any enhanced right to or claim on multina-
tional pharmaceutical company patents.
Given the industry-wide dislike of price controls, the system
could be combined with a compulsory scheme to provide an
independent TRIPS-legal basis for compulsory licensing. Pharma-
ceutical patent holders could be given a choice: accept price
controls on the patented product or process, or agree to provide
non-exclusive licenses to all domestic takers.24  In the context
of an aggressively administered price control system, most
companies would probably opt for the licensing alternative. This
proposal would not have to meld itself to fit in the constraints of
Article 31, because it would not constitute an allowance of use of
the patent "without the authorization of the right holder."
Even within the framework of Article 31, the price-control-or-
licensing option could address the most contestable issue in Article
31: determining the economic value of the authorization. In the
context of a price control scheme, the economic value of a patent
would be substantially lower than it would be were the patent
242 Any discriminatory action is likely to be violative of general GATT
principles of unequal treatment. See GATT art. XVII.
243 See, e.g., Robert T. Abbott, Written Testimony Before the House
Committee on Science, Space and Technology, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 28,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (using his company,
Viagene, as an example).
244 See James Love, Patents Vs. People, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, June
1994, at 22.
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holder permitted to charge unregulated, monopoly-profit-maximiz-
ing prices. Indeed, with an aggressively administered price control
system, the economic value may be the same to both the licensor
and the licensee.
5. A POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE
The central purpose of this Article is to argue that pharmaceu-
tical patent policy alternatives remain viable under the TRIPS
Agreement. The existence of these alternatives, however, is of
little importance if none of the alternatives are attractive. This
section first assesses the advantages of the alternatives for Third
World countries, considers and largely rejects the arguments
against the efficacy of the alternatives, and then proposes, in
capsule form, an alternative pharmaceutical patent policy approach
for Third World countries.
5.1. The Benefits of Limiting the Patent Right
The benefits of limiting the patent right accrue primarily to
two Third World groups: pharmaceutical consumers and Third
World generic manufacturers.
The benefit to the consumer is lower prices, meaning more
affordable health care. By whatever means generic production is
prompted - no patents or compulsory licensing,2 45 or shorter
patent terms246 - prices will fall. The evidence on this point is
irrefutable.
Schut and Van Bergeijk found that drug prices vary substantial-
ly across borders,247 and that direct price controls, bulk purchas-
ing, promotion of the use of generics and abolishing patents all
245 Obviously either option would bring generic competitors into the
market almost immediately.
246 In contrast, shorter patent terms would spark generic competition
sooner than longer terms would.
247 See Frederick T. Schut & Peter A.G. Van Bergeijk, International Price
Discrimination: The Pharmaceutical Industry, 14 WORLD DEV. 1141, 1147 (1986).
Specifically, a 10% increase in per capita income corresponds to an 8% increase
in average drug prices. See id. Importantly, however, they note, "Although
drug prices in developing countries are often lower than in developed countries,
the real costs of these products, relative to the purchasing power of the
population, are considerably higher (the real costs of drugs in Malawi are 12
times higher than in the United States .... )." Id.
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work to lower pharmaceutical prices. 248 The important implica-
tion of their finding that "drug prices vary arbitrarily, depending
on the existence and degree of success of a national drug policy,"
they conclude, is that pharmaceutical companies will charge what
the "market will bear."249  There is a lot of room for play in
pharmaceutical prices, and sound and effective national drug
policies can provide Third World consumers with substantial
savings.250
The empirical evidence in support of the price-reducing effects
of the introduction of generics is overwhelming. 1  Empirical
studies reveal that, "[o]ver time patents are a major factor in
sustaining high drug prices; the appearance of generic competition
results in prices of these drugs being much closer to the marginal
production costs than those of brand name companies. " 212  In
the United States, generic producers "enter the market quoting
prices much lower than those of their branded competitors, and
these prices also decline as the number of generic competitors
increases, potentially falling to roughly seventeen percent of the
branded producer's pre-entry price. "253  In Canada, in 1983,
when the country maintained a compulsory licensing system,
"[t]he average price of compulsorily-licensed drugs sold by both
the patent-holding and the compulsorily-licensed firms in Canada
248 See id.
249 See id.
211 See id. at 1148.
251 See id. (surveying the extent of the evidence).
"Id. (providing anecdotal evidence of generics selling at one-tenth the
price of their brand name counterparts in the United States).
23 Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry and Competition in the
U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS 1, 44-45 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1991).
The authors further note that "[t]he effect of additional generic competitors is
also noticeably stronger on generic prices than on branded ones." Id. at 45.
Former patent holders are able to build on name recognition, consumer
confidence and, importantly, relations with doctors to continue selling at a
supracompetitive price to a substantial segment of the market. See id. at 46.
For a detailed study of the issue of substitution of generics in the United
States for brand name drugs (by state-funded medical providers), the potential
savings from substitution, and the cultural and institutional barriers to
substitution, see generally ALISON MASSON & ROBERT L. STEINER, FEDERAL
TRADE COMM'N GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES:
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS (1985)
(publishing a report from the U.S. Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade
Commission on the effectiveness of substitution law).
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was approximately half the prices prevailing in the United States
for the same drugs;" non-compulsorily licensed drugs in Canada
cost an average of eighty percent of the U.S. price.' In India,
the adoption of price controls and a process-only patents trans-
formed Indian drug prices from among the highest in the world
to among the lowest."' And a no-patent system has driven
down drug prices in Argentina as well."5 Indeed, industry
representatives and consultants do not dispute the fact that generic
producers drive down prices. Instead, their argument is that
prices need to be maintained to enable drug manufacturers to
recoup their investments.2"
Limiting patent rights drives down prices because it facilitates
entry of generic imitative products." Because the technological
demands of producing an already patented product are substantial-
ly less than those of undertaking the research to create the
patented product, less technologically sophisticated enterprises are
254 H.C. Eastman, The Protection of Intellectual Property: Pharmaceutical
Products in Canada, in MULTINATIONALS, GOvERNMENTS AND INTERNATION-
AL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 153, 164-65 (A.E. Safarian & Gilles Y. Bertin,
eds., 1987).
" See Weissman, supra note 85, at 10 (citing a report from B.K. Keayla,
convener of the Indian National Working Group on latent Laws).
256 See Love, supra note 245, at 22. In an advertising campaign in the
United States in 1990, the Argentinean pharmaceutical manufacturers trade
group highlighted the example of an anti-arthritis drug which sold in the
United States for $169.84, but only $35.08 in Argentina. See Weissman, supra
note 85, at 10.
257 See Clemente, supra note 109, at 128-29.
Some observers argue that competition takes place among substitutable
patented drugs. See Rapp and Rozek, supra note 98, at 90-96 (arguing that high
costs associated with greater intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals
are often overstated because of incentives to find new uses for patented drugs
and competition among these drugs); Parker, supra note 175, at 136 (suggesting
that the high sales concentration in the pharmaceutical industry may ofen be
accompanied by economic rivalry). To whatever extent this sort of competi-
tion does take place, however, it clearly does not have the pro-competitive
effects of generics. If it did, patent holders would not care about generic
competition, and prices would not fall so sharply with the introduction of
generics. Moreover, to the extent that competition does take place among
substitutable patented drugs, it is not entirely socially optimal. Much of the
research money invested in substitute drugs could have been more profitably
invested - from a social rather than private corporate viewpoint - in
treatments for other ailments.
258 See Clemente, supra note 109, at 129.
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able to produce generics.259 This provides an opportunity for
fledgling companies in Third World nations with sufficiently large
domestic markets. For example, India, Argentina, and Turkey
have all developed flourishing domestic pharmaceutical industries
in the last three decades. These are arguably the result of policies
of granting no pharmaceutical patents (Argentina and Turkey) or
imposing significant limits on them (India)." Indeed, it was
through imitation that virtually every industrialized country built
up its technological capacity.261 Although industry-sponsored
scholars claim that all technologically advanced countries maintain
strong patent laws, virtually every industrialized country adopted
strong patent laws after developing their technological infrastruc-
2621ture," in significant part through copying strategies.263  Many
of the most industrialized countries have only permitted patents
on pharmaceuticals in the last couple of decades.2 4
If promoting a domestic pharmaceutical industry is a goal of
Third World policy makers, then limitations on patent rights are
sensible. But those outside of Third World countries hoping to
promote the development of domestic pharmaceutical industries
should take a clear-eyed approach. Domestic industries are not a
panacea for Third World ills. Based on his study of Turkey,
Kirim concludes that domestic manufacturers engage in many of
259 See id.
260 See GEREFFI, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 24, at 220-23
(discussing policies in Argentina); Arman S. Kirim, Reconsidering Patents and
Economic Development: A Case Study of the Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry, 13
WORLD DEv. 219, 220 (1985) [hereinafter Kirim, Reconsidering Patents] (stating
that in Turkey "[a]bolition of patents... was an important factor underlying
the substantial growth of the locally-owned drug firms"); P.L. Narayana, Indian
Pharmaceutical Industry: Problems & Prospects, MARGIN, Jan. 1984, at 39 (relating
to India).
261 See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 98, at 79.
262 See id.
263 Furthermore, in the information age - when new innovations build on
the foundation of earlier inventions to an ever greater extent - there is reason
to believe that copying is more important than ever if less industrialized nations
do not want to consign themselves to permanent have-not status.
264 Germany and France first granted patents for pharmaceuticals in 1967,
the Nordic countries in 1968, Japan in 1976, Switzerland in 1978, and Italy in
1979. See Laudeline Auriol & Francois Pham, What Pattern in Patents?, OECD
OBSERVER, Dec. 1992, at 15, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
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the same undesirable practices as their multinational counter-
parts.265 Most notably, Turkey experienced spurious product
differentiation, as well as production and promotion of drugs
irrelevant to major causes of mortality in Turkey.266 Nonethe-
less, domestic industries provide national benefits that multination-
als do not. Domestic companies are more likely to adapt and
modify technologies for local use than multinationals. 2 7  They
promote the development of the local technological infrastructure
and favor generics. 26' Furthermore, profits accumulated by
domestic companies stay within the country, rather than flowing
out and contributing to current account deficit problems.
269
Finally, many Third World countries may desire to undertake a
drug development policy geared toward meeting local needs that
do not offer sufficient market incentives to attract the interest of
multinationals. If a Third World country is going to rely on the
private sector - rather than government entities - to market and
perhaps do final stage development of the drugs, then it is likely
to need a built-up domestic industry with which it can enter into
265 See Arman S. Kirim, Transnational Corporations and Local Capital:
Comparative Conduct and Performance in the Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry,
14 WORLD DEv. 503, 516-17 (1986) [hereinafter Kirim, Transnational
Corporations].
266 See id. at 516.
267 See Gary Gereffi, The Global Pharmaceutical Industry and its Impact in
Latin America, in PROFITS, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: CASE STUDIES OF
INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA 259, 277-78 (Richard S.
Newfarmer ed., 1985) [hereinafter Gereffi, Global].
268 As Gereffi observes:
[Miany domestic private drug firms in the Third World contribute
more to national goals of resource efficiency and equity than TNCs
[transnational corporations] do. The motives underlying this socially
desirable behavior are not altruistic, however. It just so happens that
the self-interest of local firms and national development objectives
often overlap. The tendency of local companies to reduce their
reliance on foreign know-how because it compromises management
control coincides with the Third World country's interest in techno-
logical autonomy. And whereas domestic enterprises favor bulk drug
and generic product manufacture because the absence of heavy
promotion and established brand names makes competition with
TNCs easier, developing nations also prefer this strategy because it
leads to increased vertical integration and lower drug prices, especially
for essential items required by the poor.
Id. at 295.
269 See id. at 277-78.
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formal or informal partnership.?0  Even in the late stages of
product development, multinationals are not likely to pursue what
appears from their perspective as only a niche market burdened
by various government controls?21
5.2. The Costs of Limiting the Patent Right
Proponents of strict patent regimes contend strict regimes will
benefit Third World nations. 2  They assert that non-restrictive
patent systems will inhibit foreign investment - and hence
technology transfer - and dampen the development of an
indigenous research and development capacity273
As a preliminary matter, for some Third World countries,
neither of these purported costs of limited patent rights may be a
concern. 274  For countries whose dominant or sole policy
concern is with disseminating a core group of most important
drugs at low prices - the "costs" of limiting the patent rights are
not as significant.
But even those countries which are concerned with attracting
foreign investment and promoting local research and development
should not be deterred from limiting patent rights. The claim
that stronger patent protections fosters foreign investment is
analytically suspect. In the context of pharmaceuticals, choosing
the site for investments is based on factors wholly distinct from
the patent protections afforded at the site. If Merck decides to set
up research facilities in Switzerland, Switzerland's patent rules are
270 See Kirim, Reconsidering Patents, supra note 261, at 220. The existence
of a domestic industry may be necessary but it is certainly not sufficient.
Developing a local industry will not by itself automatically spark innovative
research and development. See id.
271 Cf A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World
Development: Reality or Myth?, 83 DUKE LAW J. 831, 834-44 (1987) (stating that
foreign corporations are the most prevalent beneficiaries of patents in
devefoping countries as very few inventions are made by nationals").
272 See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 98, at 87-88 (noting that U.S. research
and development expenditure abroad is predominately focused in Western
Europe where intellectual property laws are adequate while falling in Latin
American where the industry claims it is inadequate); see generally Mossinghoff,
supra note 116 (describing the effect of the patent laws of foreign countries on
American pharmaceutical research and development commitments).
273 See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 98, at 87-88.
274 See Parker, supra note 175, at 139.
275 See id.
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probably irrelevant. It plans to recoup its investment in the
international and primarily the U.S. market. The empirical
evidence does not support the claim that limiting patent
protections will result in decreased foreign investment. 627  In
Turkey, "abolishing patents ... has not adversely influenced the
flow of direct foreign investment and the transfer of technology
into the country."27 In Brazil, which eliminated patent protec-
tion for pharmaceuticals in 1969 in an effort to break the grip of
multinationals over the local industry, foreign investment in the
industry rose nearly six times in the 1970s."
The more important claim by proponents of strict patent laws
is that inadequate patent protection will impede local research and
development, or multinational research and development designed
to solve local problems. 279 There is at least a grain of truth in
this argument. It does seem likely that the promise of patent
monopolies might induce some research which would not
otherwise take place."' However, this static analysis of the
technological development process ignores the fact that Third
World countries may not have the domestic capability to
undertake that sort of research. That capability may depend in
part on building up a domestic industry through pursuit of a
nonrestrictive patent policy. Moreover, to the extent that strict
patent protection is necessary to induce research, that protection
still must come at the expense of the consumer and national
interest in lower drug prices. There is no reason to believe that
the twenty year exclusive terms mandated by the TRIPS Agree-
ment281 strikes the proper balance. To the extent there is a need
for a balance, it calls for careful calibration by policy makers
administering price controls, or setting the royalties in a compul-
sory licensing system, or determining the length of domestic
276 See Schut & Van Bergijk, supra note 248, at 1142.
277 Kirim, Reconsidering Patents, supra note 261, at 220.
278 See Gereffi, Global, supra note 268, at 289.
279 The literature supporting this contention is extensive. See, e.g., Parker,
supra note 175, at 139; Rapp & Rozek, supra note 98, at 79.
280 Note that this assumes the Third World companies are domestically
oriented, and primarily not looking to export to industrialized countries with
strict patent protections. If this assumption is incorrect, then local companies
should receive sufficient inducement from patent protections in the industrial-
ized countries.
281 See TRIPS Agreement art. 33.
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patent protection. "Ideally," concludes F.M. Scherer, perhaps the
leading scholar of compulsory licensing, "we would like a flexible
policy - one that can be 'fine-tuned' to individual circumstances.
Despite this caveat, I am persuaded that technical progress would
not grind to a halt if a uniform policy of compulsory licensing at
'reasonable royalties' . . . were implemented."282
Historical and recent empirical experience suggests Scherer's
claim is correct. It seems that proponents of strict patent policies
have vastly exaggerated whatever merit their argument may have.
After all, many industrialized countries developed pharmaceutical
industries in the absence of patent protection. Moreover, those
Third World countries not adopting strict patent policies have
proven more innovative than those who have.283 J. Davidson
Frame, after conducting a global survey and regression analysis,
finds that countries with a low commitment to supporting
intellectual property laws ("LOWCOMM countries") have, on
average, notably larger scientific and technological capacities than
other Third World countries. 4  He also finds that
LOWCOMM countries patent more heavily in the United States
than do other Third World countries.285 Frame concludes that
"it becomes increasingly difficult to accept arguments by
LOWCOMM countries that they are weak, helpless actors in the
international system who need special protection 2 6 and that the
LOWCOMM countries maintain a "double standard." 28 7 But he
strangely misses the more notable implication of his findings:
those countries with less restrictive patent protections have
developed stronger domestic research capacities while at the same
time becoming more innovative.
There are unquestionably legitimate concerns about the degree
of innovation in Third World countries. But the claim that low
282 F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT
LICENSING 85 (Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber eds., 1977).
283 See J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to Intellectual Property
Protection: An Empirical Investigation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 209, 215 (1987).
284 See id.
28s See id. at 216.
216 Id. at 215.
287 See id. at 216-17 ("These countries have been identified by various
sources as having the most flagrant disregard for intellectual property among
the countries of the world, yet they are first among Third World countries to
take advantage of intellectual property protection offered in the world's largest
market.")
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levels of research and development are caused by inadequate
patent protection is dubious. What is missing to a greater or
lesser degree in most Third World countries is a science and
technology infrastructure - a national system of advanced
education and research. A patent system simply cannot provide
those things.
6. CONCLUSION: FORMULATING AN ALTERNATIVE
The primary concerns of a rational drug policy for Third
World nations should be disseminating useful drugs as widely and
cheaply as possible, and encouraging research and development of
products to address local illnesses.288 These will often include
tropical diseases that do not draw the attention of corporations
from industrialized countries.289
As I have alluded earlier, I believe a critically important
approach to the first of those goals is the adoption and implemen-
tation of an Essential Drugs program.29 But Essential Drugs
programs relate only tangentially to patent policy, and are outside
of the scope of this paper.
Within the realm of patent policy, the best means to achieve
the first goal - of providing drugs widely and cheaply - is to
promote generic production. I believe compulsory licensing - in
conjunction with price controls if necessary to pass TRIPS muster
- is the most feasible means to promote generics. Compulsory
licensing is a decentralized, anti-bureaucratic means to ensure the
rapid development of generics once the system is legislated into
place or otherwise adopted. It is structurally pro-competitive, and
hence not easily susceptible to corruption, incompetence, or lack
of resources.
The development of the domestic industry as an outgrowth of
a compulsory licensing system may aid in the creation of an
indigenous research capacity and in promoting research on local
illnesses. Historical experience shows, however, that developing
288 See Gereffi, supra note 187, at 276-77 (exploring the often inappropriate
mix of pharmaceuticals offered in Third World nations).
289 See, e.g., id. at 276 (pointing to India where the most prevalent diseases
include malaria, dysentery, and filariasis, but pharmaceutical sales focus on
vitamins, cold medicines, and "health restorers5.
290 On the case for essential drugs programs, see generally MELROSE, supra
note 175.
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a domestic industry will not accomplish these goals by itself. To
achieve these ends, Third World nations should look to the
example of the United States - not for its patent law, but for its
biomedical infrastructure, which is crucially dependent on
government funding.291 Collective action problems and other
factors affecting corporate incentive, structure, and organization
preclude private industry by itself from accomplishing what
government funding can: development of an indigenous capacity
in basic and early-phase applied research which creates break-
through advances and spins off into commercial applications.
With very few exceptions, however, Third World nations do not
have available funds easily diverted into biomedical research
programs in national universities or laboratories. There are,
however, at least two attractive options to generate these monies.
First, a percentage of royalty payments to patent licensors could
go to a national biomedical fund.292 Second, a national tax
could be placed on all drug sales, or, preferably, on all non-
essential drug sales, with the resulting revenue also directed to the
national biomedical fund.
This collection of proposals would be: non-discriminatory in
GATT terms; compatible with the TRIPS Agreement; an effective
method of attending to the pharmaceutical-related public health
needs of the poor segments of the population; and an effective
means to overcome the spurious tradeoff between fair prices and
research posited by proponents of strict patent policies.
The key to implementing reforms of this sort is conceptualiz-
ing and promoting them as legitimate and valid policy choices.
Once they have crossed the threshold of legitimacy in practical,
political, economic, legal, and metaphoric terms, they can be
considered on their merits. This will provide the best ultimate
chance of popular acceptance and approval, and, ultimately,
implementation.
291 This portion of this Article's proposal elaborates on suggestions made
by James Love. See Love, supra note 245, at 24.
292 This can be conceived of as an amount separate from the royalty, a tax
on the royalty or a portion of the royalty - all three are essentially the same.
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